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OKLAHOMA WATER RIGHTS:
WHAT GOOD ARE THEY?
GARY D. ALLISON*
I. Introduction
In Oklahoma water rights are entitlements to take water from surface and
groundwater sources for reasonable/beneficial uses.1 In an ideal world,
* Director of the Sustainable Energy & Resources Law Program, and Professor of
Law at the University of Tulsa College of Law. B.S., 1968, University of Tulsa; J.D., 1972,
University of Tulsa College of Law; LL.M., 1976, Columbia University School of Law.
This article is dedicated to the memories of the late Joseph F. Rarick, Professor of Law
at the University of Oklahoma School of Law, who the author believes was the godfather of
modern Oklahoma water law, and the late Eric B. Jensen, Assistant Dean and Assistant
Professor of Law at the University of Tulsa College of Law, who introduced Water Law to
the University of Tulsa College of Law curriculum. The author wishes to thank Dean
Couch, General Counsel of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board, for his continuing
willingness to share his knowledge and insight about how Oklahoma confers and manages
water rights, and my research assistants, Wyatt Cox and Jason Groves, for their invaluable
diligent and accurate work on this project.
1. With respect to stream and lake water, Oklahoma is a dual rights state, which means
it “recognizes riparian and appropriative rights as coexistent.” Franco-American Charolaise,
Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 571 (Okla. 1990). “[T]he modified common-law
riparian right to the reasonable use of the stream is the controlling norm of the law in
Oklahoma.” Id. at 575. For appropriation rights, “[beneficial use shall be the basis, the
measure and the limit of the right to the use of water . . . .” 82 OKLA. STAT. § 105.2.A
(2011).
Oklahoma has a declared that it is “the public policy of this state . . . to utilize the
ground water resources of the state, and for that purpose to provide reasonable regulations
for the allocation of reasonable use based on hydrologic surveys of fresh groundwater basins
or subbasins . . . .” Id. § 1020.2(A). However, in determining whether to grant a permit to
take and use groundwater, the Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB) must determine
and find that “the use to which the applicant intends to put the water is a beneficial use.” Id.
§ 1020.9(A)(1)(b), (2)(b).
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Oklahoma water law should provide Oklahoma water users with “stability
and certainty in water rights.”2 Unfortunately, the question what good are
Oklahoma water rights must be asked because as documented below
Oklahoma water law has three major flaws that potentially deprive
Oklahoma water users of stability and certainty.
First and foremost, the unfortunate 1990 Oklahoma Supreme Court
decision in Franco-American-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma
Water Resources Board,3 revived the Riparian Rights Doctrine4 after it was
all but extinguished in favor of the Prior Appropriation Doctrine5 by water
rights reforms enacted in 1963.6 As a consequence, Oklahoma has once
2. See 82 OKLA. STAT. § 105.1(A).
3. 855 P.2d 568.
4. For purposes of this article, the Riparian Rights Doctrine refers to the right of all
owners of land that abuts a water course (stream or lake) to have the equal right to make
reasonable use of the water that flows through or by their land. 1 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS §§ 7.01, 7.02 at 7-2, 7-14, 7-15 (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelly eds., 3d ed. 2009)
[hereinafter WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 2009 ED.].
5. For purposes of this article, the Prior Appropriation Doctrine refers to
[a] property right in the use of water . . . created by [the] diversion of the water
from a stream (or lake) and its application to a beneficial use. Water can be
used at any location, without regard to the position of [the] place of use in
relation to the stream. In the event of a shortage of supply, water will be
supplied up to a limit of the right in order of temporal priority: the last man to
divert and make use of the stream is the first to have his supply cutoff.
Id. § 12.01, at 12-3 (quoting CHARLES J. MEYERS, A HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
OF THE APPROPRIATION SYSTEM 4 (1971)).
6. Franco-American, 855 P.2d at 571. Prior to the 1963 water reforms, the basis of
Oklahoma Riparian rights was the statutory declaration that
[w]ater running in a definite stream, formed by nature over or under the surface
may be used by him [the owner of land] as long as it remains there; but he may
not prevent the natural flow of the stream, or of the natural spring from which it
commences its definite course, nor pursue nor pollute the same.
60 OKLA. STAT. § 60 (1961) (quoted in relevant part as found in Joseph R. Rarick, Oklahoma
Water Law, Stream and Surface in the Pre-1963 Period, 22 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1969))
[hereinafter Rarick, Pre-1963 Period]. Under the 1963 water reforms, all persons, including
riparian landowners, were required to seek appropriation permits if they sought to take water
from Oklahoma streams for non-domestic uses. Act of June 10, 1963, ch. 205, §§ 1, 2(a),
1963 Okla. Sess. Laws 268 (codified as 60 OKLA. STAT. § 60 (2001)); 82 OKLA. STAT. §
105.2(A) (2001). All persons making non-domestic uses of water at the time the water
rights reforms were enacted, whether as an appropriator or a riparian landowner, were
required to participate in an adjudication to validate their uses as vested rights to use specific
quantities of water for specific beneficial uses and to attach a specified priority date to their
vested uses. Act of June 10, 1963, ch. 205, § 2 (b), 1963 Okla. Sess. Laws 268-69 (priority
determinations), modified by Act of Apr. 7, 1972, ch. 256, § 2 B., 1972 Okla. Sess. Laws
593-94 (codified with modifications at 82 OKLA. STAT. § 105.2(B) (2001)); Act of June 10,
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again rejoined the dwindling ranks of states that recognize a true dual water
rights system.7 Part II of this article chronicles the events leading to
Franco-American’s revival of the Riparian Rights Doctrine, provides a
critical analysis of the final Franco-American decision, describes the
essential characteristics of the dual rights system Franco-American revived,
demonstrates how the revived dual rights system inflicts instability and
uncertainty on Oklahoma’s existing and prospective water users, and
proposes solutions for ending this instability and uncertainty.
Second, Oklahoma water law does not sufficiently recognize hydraulic
connections between groundwater and stream water.8 This leaves users of
1963, ch. 207, § 10, 1963 Okla. Sess. Laws 274-76 (vested rights determination process).
Non-domestic uses which were not validated in the vested water rights procedures were
effectively extinguished because they did not receive priority dates essential to their
recognition within the appropriation rights system. Act of June 10, 1963, ch. 205, § 2 (b),
1963 Okla. Sess. Laws 268, modified by Act of Apr. 7, 1972, ch. 256, § 2 B., 1963 Okla.
Sess. Laws 593 (codified with modifications as 82 OKLA. STAT. § 105.2(B) (2001)). So,
these reforms converted the non-domestic uses by landowners of water from streams riparian
to their land into appropriation rights subject to the appropriation doctrine’s first-in-time,
first-in-right and use-it-or-lose-it rules. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 105.2(B), 105.2(D). For a
comprehensive history of the 1963 water reform, see Joseph R. Rarick, Oklahoma Water
Law, Stream and Surface Under the 1963 Amendments, 23 OKLA. L. REV. 19 (1970); Rarick,
Pre-1963 Period, supra note 6.
7. For purposes of this article, the term “true dual water rights system” means that the
water laws of the state still recognize the rights of landowners to take water from streams
riparian to their land for new or expanded non-domestic uses without obtaining an
appropriation permit. As of now, California and Nebraska are the only other states with
“true dual water rights systems.” See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 2009 ED., supra note 4,
§ 8.03(b)(5), at 8-59.
8. For purposes of this article, hydraulic connection “means that water can move
between a surface water source and an adjacent aquifer.” OR. ADMIN. R. 690-009-0020(6).
In some states, such as Colorado, hydraulically connected stream water and groundwater are
managed conjunctively with respect to the allocation of water rights. See Park Cnty.
Sportsmen’s Ranch LLP v. Bargas, 986 P.2d 262, 265-66 (Colo. 1999). Thus, in Colorado,
groundwater aquifers that are hydraulically connected to streams are treated as stream water
subject to the prior appropriation water rights system. Id. at 265.
With one exception described below, Oklahoma allocates the right to use water from
groundwater basins through its Groundwater Law and allocates the right to use stream water
through the application of the Riparian Rights Doctrine as defined in Franco-American and
its statutorily based Prior Appropriation system. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 60; Franco-American,
855 P.2d at 571. Moreover, with one exception, hydraulic connection is not a factor that
influences the granting or scope of water rights.
Oklahoma’s application of different water right systems to groundwater sources and
streams with little consideration of hydraulic connection is a function of how it defines
stream water and groundwater. Stream water is water that flows in a definite stream, 60
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water from streams that are hydraulically connected to a groundwater
source vulnerable to supply disruptions caused by groundwater pumping.9
OKLA. STAT. § 60 (2011); 82 OKLA. STAT. §§ 105.2(A) (2011), 1020.1(1) (2011), and
groundwater is “fresh water under the surface of the earth regardless of the geological
structure in which it is standing or moving outside the cut bank of any definite stream,” 82
OKLA. STAT. § 1020.1(1) (2011). Thus, the terms “definite stream” and “cut bank” are the
keys to distinguishing stream water from groundwater.
In Oklahoma, a “definite stream” is “a watercourse in a definite, natural channel, with
defined beds and banks.” 82 OKLA. STAT. § 105.1(1) (2011). The term “cut bank” is not
defined either by other Oklahoma Groundwater statutes, see 82 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1020.11020.22 or the OWRB’s Groundwater regulations, OKLA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 785: 30-1-1 –
785: 30-13-9, but it seems clear from Oklahoma’s definitions of groundwater and “definite
stream” that groundwater is freshwater found below the surface and outside vertical
extensions of the boundaries of streams as defined by their banks regardless of its
hydrological connection to a definite stream.” See Eric B. Jensen, The Allocation of
Percolating Water Under the Oklahoma Ground Water Law of 1972, 14 TULSA L.J. 437,
445-46 (1979). In turn, groundwater found within the area defined by the vertical extensions
of a stream’s boundary belongs to the stream above even if it is within a groundwater source
that is not hydraulically connected to the stream. Id.
Prior to 2003, the OWRB awarded groundwater permits without regard to any
hydraulic connections between groundwater sources and surface sources. Applicants would
receive a groundwater permit upon the OWRB finding that the applicant owns land that
overlies the groundwater basin, seeks the water for a beneficial use, and will not commit
waste. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1020.9(A)(1)(a)-(c), (2)(a)-(c). In 2003, Oklahoma modified its
Ground Water Law so that now the OWRB will not award a groundwater permit unless it
also finds “the proposed use . . . [will not] . . . degrade or interfere with springs or streams
emanating in whole or in part from water originating from a sensitive sole source
groundwater basin . . . .” Act of June 3, 2003, ch. 365, § 3, 2003 Okla. Sess. Laws 1576-77
(codified at 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1020.9(A)(1)(d), (2)(d) (constitutionality upheld in Jacobs
Ranch L.L.C. v. Smith, 148 P.3d 842 (Okla. 2006). Sole source groundwater basins are
those that the United States Environmental Protection Agency has designated in whole or in
part as a sole or principal drinking water source for purposes of implementing the Safe
Drinking Water Act. Safe Drinking Water Act § 2(a), 88 Stat. 1678 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
300h-3 (e) (2011)); 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1020.9(A)(B)(1). It is therefore clear that the OWRB
does not have to consider hydraulic connection issues when determining whether to grant
permits for pumping water from groundwater basins that are not sole source groundwater
basins as defined above.
9. For example, in Messer-Bowers Co. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Board, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that water that is the source of a spring that feeds a stream is
to be deemed groundwater, regardless of its impact on the availability of stream water, if the
applicant for a groundwater permit seeks to “drain water directly from [a] groundwater
basin.” 8 P.3d 877, 880 (Okla. 2000). In reaching this holding, the court distinguished
Messer-Bowers from its holding in Oklahoma Water Resources Board. v. City of Lawton, in
which it deemed water that is the source of a spring that feeds a stream to be stream water
when the applicant sought to access it at the point where the spring flowed from the earth.
580 P.2d 510, 513 (Okla. 1978). Thus, although groundwater is the source of all springs,
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Part III of this article demonstrates how Oklahoma water law fails to
coordinate sufficiently the management of groundwater pumping with
stream water uses and proposes the means for establishing a workable comanagement system.
Third, Oklahoma groundwater law mandates the mining of water from
major groundwater sources in a manner that could end their useful lives as
sources of fresh water within twenty years.10 As a matter of policy,

and many springs are the sources of stream water, an overlying landowner may take
groundwater in a manner that dries out hydrologically connected streams as long as the
landowner does so by taking the water directly from the groundwater basin. Messer-Bowers,
8 P.3d at 880.
10. Oklahoma considers groundwater basins to be major sources of water if they are
bedrock aquifers yielding on average fifty gallons per minute (gpm) per well or are alluvium
or alluvium and terrace aquifers yielding on average 150 gpm per well. 82 OKLA. STAT. §
1020.1(3). For purposes of regulating the withdrawal of water from major groundwater
sources, the OWRB is directed to establish a maximum annual yield that “shall be based
upon a minimum basin or subbasin life of twenty (20) years”. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1020.5(B)
(2001). Despite this language, the OWRB sets maximum annual yields so that twenty years
of extracting water at the maximum annual yield will not deplete the basin or subbasin but
rather will leave enough water below half the overlying acreage to satisfy only domestic
needs and enough water below the remaining half of the overlying acreage to exceed the
volume of water needed to meet domestic needs. Telephone Interview with Dean Couch,
General Counsel, Oklahoma Water Resources Board (Feb. 24, 2012).
This mining mandate emanates from a dramatic change in Oklahoma’s groundwater
policy. From June 6, 1949, to July 1, 1973, it was the groundwater policy of Oklahoma to
“conserve and protect the ground water resources of the State and for that purpose to provide
reasonable regulations for the taking and use of ground water.” Oklahoma Ground Water
Law, ch. 11, § 3, 1949 Okla. Sess. Laws 642. In furtherance of this policy, the 1949
Oklahoma Ground Water Law prohibited the Oklahoma Planning and Resources Board from
issuing permits for withdrawing ground water if it found that “such use would result in
depletion above the annual ratio of recharge.” Id. § 13, at 645.
In 1972, the Oklahoma legislature rewrote Oklahoma’s groundwater laws. Act of Apr.
7, 1972, ch. 248, 1972 Okla. Sess. Laws 529-34. In doing so, it declared that is was now the
groundwater policy of Oklahoma
to utilize the ground water resources of the state, and for that purpose to
provide reasonable regulations for the allocation for reasonable use based on
hydrologic surveys of fresh ground water basins or subbasins to determine a
restriction on the production, based upon the acres overlying the ground water
basin and subbasin.
Id. § 2, at 530 (codified with modifications at 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1020.2 (2011)). Reflecting
this pro-use philosophy, the 1972 groundwater modifications relegated the recharge rate to
being just one factor the OWRB must consider in determining the maximum annual yield for
each groundwater basin of subbasin, and decreed that maximum annual yields “shall be
based upon a minimum basin or subbasin life of twenty (20) years.” Id. § 5, at 530 (codified
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allowing groundwater aquifers to be mined is defensible only as applied to
aquifers with recharge rates that are too low to provide water users with
useful quantities of water.11 Part IV of this article describes the dynamics
of sustainable groundwater sources, assesses the degree to which Oklahoma
authorizes the mining of aquifers with recharge rates capable of making
them sustainable sources of water, and proposes changes to Oklahoma
groundwater law that will effectively prevent the mining of sustainable
groundwater sources and more rationally regulate the withdrawals of water
from groundwater sources that cannot deliver useful quantities of water
unless they are mined.
II. The Dual/Riparian Rights Problem
A. The Riparian Revival
The controversy leading to the Oklahoma Supreme Court reviving
riparian rights through its Franco-American decision was a saga lasting
nearly thirteen years.12 It began in the summer of 1980, when drought
conditions coupled with the City of Ada’s (Ada) continuing exercise of an
appropriation water right to take water from Byrds Mill Spring allegedly
caused Mill Creek to go dry to the detriment of downstream senior
appropriators and riparian domestic users (hereinafter referred to as

as modified to apply the twenty year minimum life mandate only to major basins and
subbasins at 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1020.5(A), (B) (2011)).
11. See 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 2009 ED., supra note 4, § 18.05, at 18-49 to 1854; Peter H. Gleick, Mining Groundwater for Profit: The Cadiz Project, HUFF POST GREEN
(Jan. 24, 2012, 1:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-h-gleick/cadiz-project-envir
onment_b_1228398.html.
12. For a detailed account of this saga, see Gary D. Allison, Franco-American
Charolaise: The Never Ending Story, 30 TULSA L.J. 1, 24-50 (1994). The saga included the
nearly six years it took the Oklahoma Supreme Court to finalize its decision after first
issuing a decision that was the polar opposite of the final one. In its first decision, by a vote
of six to three, the court preserved the unitary water rights system created by the 1963 water
rights reforms. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 58 OKLA. BAR J.
1406, 1407, 1411, 1414 nn.30-32 (Okla. May 19, 1987); Allison, supra note 12, at 45. This
decision was withdrawn pursuant to petitions for rehearing, and the court subsequently
issued a new decision in which it effectively reversed its first decision and revived the
riparian rights doctrine. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 61
OKLA. BAR J. 1114 (Okla. Apr. 24, 1990). The second decision was also promptly
withdrawn, and nearly three years later it was issued unchanged and became the official
Franco-American decision. Franco-American, 855 P.2d 568.
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landowners).13 Thereafter, Ada filed an application with the OWRB to
increase its appropriation rights to take water from Byrds Mill Spring.14
Ada’s application was bitterly opposed by disgruntled landowners in the
OWRB proceedings.15 Riparian rights were never asserted or mentioned
during the OWRB proceedings,16 and the OWRB issued Ada a new
appropriation permit granting it the right to appropriate significantly more
water from Byrds Mill Spring.17 Accordingly, in the various appeals that
followed there were numerous non-riparian issues at stake. However, these
non-riparian issues are not discussed because the focus of this article in on
how Franco-American revived riparian rights.
On appeal in state district court, the disgruntled landowners asserted a
riparian rights argument for the first time.18 They contended that by
granting additional appropriation rights to Ada, the OWRB had allocated
the entire flow of Byrds Mill Spring to consumptive users and therefore the
streams fed by the spring would go dry even during average flow years.19
The landowners then argued that OWRB orders permitting appropriations
that would dry out Byrd Mills Creek would unconstitutionally deprive them
of their riparian right to a minimum stream flow in the streams abutting

13. Franco-American, 855 P.2d at 571; Transcript of Protest Hearing on City of Ada
Stream Water Application No. 80-107, at 105, 106, 118 (Dec. 18, 1980) (testimony of
George Braly) [hereinafter G. Braly Testimony] (on file with author).
14. Application of City of Ada to Oklahoma Water Resources Board (Aug. 21, 1980), in
Records at 1, Franco-American, 855 P.2d 568 (No. 59,310) (on file with author) (seeking to
appropriate an additional 7842 AF/y from the Byrds Mill Spring).
15. Protest Hearing on City of Ada Stream Water Application No. 80-107, supra note
13, at 97-101 (testimony of Mack Braly, Sr.); G. Braly Testimony, supra note 13, at 101-18.
At the time of the Protest Hearing, Mack Braly, a rancher, was nearly seventy years old, and
he had the assertiveness that may be expected of a person who had been on General George
Patton’s Third Army officer staff. Interview with George Braly, in Ada, Okla. (Mar. 14,
1994). Mack Braly’s son George Braly, an attorney rancher who had earned an
undergraduate engineering degree with a concentration in fluid mechanics from Brown
University, acted as an attorney in these proceeding on behalf of his father, himself, and
domestic riparian users and appropriators located downstream from Bryds Mill Spring. G.
Braly Testimony, supra note 13, at 102. He was a very aggressive cross-examiner of
opposition witnesses.
16. Id. at 120-26 (closing argument of George Braly).
17. Id.; Permit to Appropriate Stream Water, No. P80-107 (Okla. Water Res. Bd., May
12, 1981), in Records, supra note 14, at 323 (authorizing City of Ada to appropriate another
5340 AF/y from Bryds Mill Spring).
18. Brief for Appellant at 2, 20-22, Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water
Res. Bd, No. C-81-23 (Coal Cnty. Dist. Ct. Okla. Sept. 21, 1981).
19. Id.
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their land.20 They also asserted that the riparian landowners’ rights to a
minimum stream supports “a beneficial use of water; beneficial for fish,
wildlife, and aesthetic purposes.”21
The district court found for the landowners, issuing a narrow
constitutional holding that riparian landowners have a vested right to a
natural, normal flow or underflow of the stream that cannot be taken
without compensation, and that this right is taken when appropriations
granted pursuant to the 1963 water rights reforms would dry up substantial
streams.22 This was a far cry from restoring fully riparian rights and reestablishing Oklahoma’s Dual Rights System. As Franco-American left the
district court for the Oklahoma Supreme Court, no one had as yet asked for

20. The landowners cited language from the court’s syllabus in Baker v. Ellis, 292 P.2d
1037 (Okla. 1956), for the proposition that “each [riparian] is limited to a reasonable use,
with due regard to the rights and necessities of others interested. It is the right of all to have
the stream substantially preserved in its natural size, flow, and purity and protected from
material diversion.” Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 21.
In fact, the riparian law applied by the Baker court was based on the reasonable use
theory of riparian rights: “Where plaintiff and defendant both own land adjacent to a
definite water course, both of them are entitled to a reasonable use of the waters thereof so
long as such use does not cause substantial damage or detriment to the other.” Baker, 292
P.2d at 1039. The court applied this language to the facts of the case to enjoin the
construction of a dam on the defendants’ land that would have severely diminished the flow
of water the plaintiff had relied on to water his cattle. Id. at 1039-40.
21. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 22.
22. Id. at 5, 7-11. Judge Fishel reached this conclusion by misreading Baker, for the
proposition that in Oklahoma riparian landowners have a vested right to some maintenance
of a stream flow through or by their land. In fact, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has long
held that Oklahoma is a reasonable use state, meaning that riparian land owners may
diminish the flow of the stream to accommodate reasonable uses of water. Smith v.
Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 172 P.2d 1002, 1004-06 (1946); Franco-American, No. C-81-23,
at 8. He then bolstered this conclusion by citing Wasserburger v. Coffee, 141 N.W.2d 738
(Neb. 1966) (holding that riparian rights acquired by the settlement of riparian lands prior to
the Nebraska legislature enacting the prior appropriation system were superior to all
appropriative rights, id. at 742-47, and that conflicts between the two would be settled by a
comparative reasonableness analysis, id. at 745-47) and United States v. Gerlach Livestock
Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950) (holding that under California law, riparian landowners were
entitled to be compensated for the loss of benefits accruing to their grasslands from the
seasonal overflows from the streams passing through their land even though this method of
receiving water was extremely wasteful, id. at 729, 730, 742-55). Franco-American, No. C81-23, at 9-11. From these cases and his misreading of Ellis, Judge Fishel held that Ada
could not appropriate water in a manner that deprived downstream riparian landowners of
their rights to a reasonable minimum flow without condemning these rights. Id. at 11.
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the 1963 water rights reforms to be declared unconstitutional or for a
complete restoration of the Riparian Rights Doctrine. 23
Ada’s attempt to appropriate more water from Byrds Mill Spring was
threatened by the district court’s holding that riparian landowners have the
right to have a minimum flow of water pass through or by their land.24 So,
in its appeal to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, Ada argued that riparian
rights in Oklahoma consist of the right to the reasonable use of the stream
rather than to a minimum flow,25 the 1963 water reforms limited this right
of reasonable use to domestic uses,26 and it was constitutional for the 1963
water reforms to cut-off the right of riparian landowners to initiate new or
expanded non-domestic uses, including those that would be supported by a
minimum stream flow, without securing an appropriation permit.27 Ada
23. In his conclusion of law with respect to the minimum flow issue, Judge Fishel noted
that:
The Protestants have not made a general challenge to the constitutionality of
Oklahoma’s stream water appropriations statutes, but do however assert that
whatever power the State may have under its inherent police power to protect
the general public . . . the exercise of such power cannot extend so far as to
completely dry up what has historically been a substantial stream which flowed
in dry weather, as well as in wet weather.
...
This Court at this time is not required to determine how much stream flow
is enough. The Protestants have merely asserted that a trickle or zero stream
flow is certainly not enough. With this assertion, this Court agrees.
Franco-American, No. C-81-23, at 8.
24. See Brief for Appellant at 8-9, Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water
Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1990) (No. 59,310).
25. Key elements of this argument included the Appellant’s contentions that:
(1) There was never a time under Oklahoma law when the Appellee riparian landowners
land had a “clear unquestioned riparian right.” Brief for Appellant, supra note 24, at 2-3;
Reply Brief for Appellant at 10-23, Franco-American, 855 P.2d 568 (No. 59,310).
(2) Riparian rights cases in Oklahoma emphasize the right of use, not flow. Brief for
Appellant, supra note 24, at 3-5, Franco-American, 855 P.2d 568 (No. 59,310); Reply Brief
for Appellant at 33, Franco-American, 855 P.2d 568 (No. 59,310) (debunking the notion that
Baker v. Ellis established that riparian landowners have flow rights as well as the right of
reasonable use).
26. Brief for Appellant, supra note 24, at 5-6; Reply Brief for Appellant, supra note 25,
at 33.
27. To this end, the Appellant argued that:
(1) The 1963 water reforms ended any riparian right to a minimum flow because it added
language to the provision prohibiting landowners from preventing the natural flow of the
stream to declare that the water within that natural flow becomes public water and is
“subject to appropriation.” Brief for Appellant, supra note 24, at 5-6.
(2) The 1963 water reforms protected vested rights based on existing riparian reasonable
uses still in existence at the time the reforms became effective through a process for
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closed by asserting that its riparian challengers had no vested right to a
minimum stream flow and they would have to secure an appropriation
permit to secure the minimum stream flow needed to support the nonconsumptive beneficial uses they sought to advance.28 It is to be noted that
in its Reply Brief, Ada also asserted that its landowner challengers had
waived any rights they may have had by virtue of owning riparian land by
previously obtaining appropriation rights.29
Having begun their opposition to Ada’s quest to appropriate more water
from Byrds Mill Spring in defense of their appropriation rights,30 the
landowners responded to Ada’s supreme court appeal as Riparian
Landowners.31 They first contended that prior to statehood only the
riparian rights system operated in the Indian Territory and therefore their
predecessors acquired vested riparian rights that in some form were passed
on to them.32 Next, the landowners traced the codification of various water

converting those uses into appropriation rights. Id. at 12; Reply Brief for Appellant, supra
note 25, at 24.
(3) States have the right to change their water law as long as they protect vested rights.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 24, at 5-6; Reply Brief for Appellant, supra note 25, at 25-33
(detailing the successful efforts of other states to extinguish unused riparian rights and
distinguishing the circumstances in California and Nebraska where riparian landowners still
have limited rights to initiate new or expanded reasonable non-domestic uses).
(4) Past Oklahoma laws conferring condemnation rights on riparian landowners did not
impose constitutional barriers to extinguishing unused riparian rights, Reply Brief for
Appellant, supra note 25, at 36-51.
(a) The only Oklahoma condemnation statute that expressly referred to the condemnation
of riparian rights was taken verbatim from Texas, and the Texas Supreme Court held that it
was no barrier to Texas extinguishing unused riparian rights. Id. at 37-41, 48-49.
(b) After 1909, Oklahoma statutes concerning the condemnation of water rights did not
expressly mention riparian rights and applied only to water rights perfected by use. Id. at
41-49.
(c) Seven of the nine states that once had dual water rights regimes managed to abolish
the unused riparian right without compensation (Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon,
South Dakota, Texas and Washington), leaving only California which did not attempt to
abolish riparian rights. Id. at 48-51.
28. Id. at 61-63.
29. Id. at 2-4. In support of this assertion, Ada cited a century-old Oregon case for the
proposition that the exercise of the one is the waiver of the other. Id. at 3 (citing North
Powder Mill Co. v. Coughanour, 54 P. 223, 227 (1898)).
30. Protest Hearing on City of Ada Stream Water Application No. 80-107, supra note
13, at 120-26 (closing argument of George Braly).
31. Answer Brief for Appellees, Franco-American, 855 P.2d 568 (No. 59,310).
32. Id. at 77-81.
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rights condemnation statutes from pre-statehood through 1972,33 and
asserted that these statutes “declared the constitutional right of the riparian
to be compensated for any loss of this right to use water in a stream on his
property.”34 The landowners closed by arguing that the 1963 water reforms
took from them without compensation vested flow rights they obtained by
owning riparian land35 and that the minimum flow they sought to protect
was supporting several beneficial uses.36
In its first attempt to resolve the dispute between Ada and the
landowners, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided in favor of the
landowners on all of the non-riparian issues,37 but it held that in Oklahoma
the only vested riparian rights were the non-domestic riparian uses that had
been converted into vested rights through the vested rights proceedings
established by the 1963 water reforms.38 This opinion was soon withdrawn
pursuant to petitions for rehearing.39
On April 24, 1990, the Oklahoma Supreme Court issued what became its
final Franco-American opinion.40 Leaving nothing to suspense, Justice
Opala, writing for a Five-Justice Majority, followed his statement of the
33. Id. at 82-86.
34. Id. at 86.
35. In support of this argument, the landowners interpreted United States v. Gerlach
Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950), and Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison, 252 P.
607 (Cal. 1926), as establishing that historic riparian rights cannot be infringed by
appropriators in absence of compensation. Answer Brief for Appellees at 92-94, 103-105,
Franco-American, 855 P.2d 568 (No. 59,310). Then the landowners argued that they had
actually used the flow rights they were defending because they derived non-consumptive
benefits from them and were therefore entitled either to the flow necessary to preserve these
benefits or compensation for their loss. Id. at 95-96. They closed this argument by asserting
that accounts of how the 1963 water reforms were drafted demonstrated that the drafters
knew they were attempting to take without compensation the non-consumptive benefits of
riparian rights. Id. at 96-99.
36. The landowners characterized the minimum flow that they sought to protect as the
“dry weather base flow, or ‘ordinary flow’ . . . .” Answer Brief for Appellees, supra note
35, at 104. They equated the dry weather base flow with the water provided to the Mill
Creek-Clear Boggy Stream System by Byrds Mill Spring during times when there is no
rainfall runoff flowing into the stream. Id. at 101-02, 111-14.
37. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 58 OKLA. B.J. 1406,
1408-14 (Okla. May 19, 1987).
38. Id. at 1407, 1411, 1414 nn. 30-32.
39. Allison, supra note 12, at 45.
40. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 61 OKLA. B.J. 1114
(Okla. Apr. 24, 1990). As was its first opinion, the court’s 1990 opinion was also withdrawn
pursuant to a petition for rehearing, and nearly three years later (April 13, 1993) it was
finally released without change. See Allison, supra note 12, at 47.
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questions by promptly announcing the rival of the Riparian Rights
Doctrine:
We hold that the Oklahoma riparian owner enjoys a vested
common-law right to the reasonable use of the stream. This right
is a valuable part of the property owner’s ‘bundle of sticks’ and
may not be taken for public use without compensation. We
further hold that, inasmuch as 60 O.S. 1981 § 60, as amended in
1963, limits the riparian owner to domestic use and declares that
all other water in the stream becomes public water subject to
appropriation without any provision for compensating the
riparian owner, the statute violates Art. 2 § 24, Okl. Const.
In addition, we declare that the California Doctrine . . . ,
which recognizes riparian and appropriative rights as coexistent,
is the prevailing law in Oklahoma; . . . that a perfected
appropriative right is a vested right which may not be
permanently divested except for nonuse . . . but is subject to
senior appropriative rights and reasonable riparian uses during
shortages; and that in the future a riparian owner seeking an
appropriation of stream water must be deemed to have
voluntarily relinquished his riparian rights in that stream
except . . . for domestic uses.41
B. A Critical Analysis
The Court justified its revival of the common-law riparian right through
a rather simplistic takings analysis.42 This analysis began with the Court
piecing together a working description of the common-law riparian right it
had just revived.43 The Court’s fragmented descriptions of the commonlaw riparian right can be summarized as a vested property right of
landowners to initiate or expand at any time the non-domestic use of water
from streams abutting their land, to maintain these uses as long as they are
reasonable as compared to other riparian uses, to assume the risk that their
existing uses will someday be destroyed by a court finding them to be
41. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 571
(Okla. 1990).
42. Id. at 576-77.
43. The court did not in one place provide this working definition; however, a working
definition nevertheless emerges by piecing together the court’s various descriptions of the
riparian right, id. at 572, 573, 575 & n. 40, and discussions of how it was impaired by the
1963 water reforms. See id. at 576-77.
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unreasonable in light of another landowner initiating a new use deemed to
be more valuable, and to have all reasonable riparian uses accorded equal
priority superior to all appropriative uses.44
Then the Court provided a disjointed discussion defining the term vested
right and distinguishing between government action that regulates it from
that which takes it.45 To this end, the Court declared that “[a] vested right is
the power to do certain actions . . . lawfully, . . . is substantially a property
right, [and once] created, . . . becomes absolute, and is protected from
legislative invasion . . . .”46 As a result of its definition of a vested right, the
Court implied that the common-law right to make reasonable use of stream
water “has been long recognized . . . as a private property right.”47 After
citing cases distinguishing between an example of the State regulating the
use of private property (i.e., regulating the manner in which hydrocarbons
are extracted) in a manner that did not require it to pay compensation,48 and
an example of a City taking private property (i.e., extracting and selling
hydrocarbons from under a person’s land after prohibiting him from
44. This summary is derived from the court’s fragmented descriptions of the commonlaw riparian right. Thus, the court declared that “[r]iparian rights arise from land ownership,
attaching only to those lands which touch the stream. A riparian interest, though one in real
property, is not absolute or exclusive; it is usufructuary in character and subject to the rights
of other riparian owners. A riparian right is neither constant nor judicially quantifiable in
futuro.” Id. at 573. “The common-law riparian right extends to the reasonable use of the
stream . . . [and t]he last riparian use asserted has as much priority as the first.” Id. at 572.
“[A] riparian owner may use the stream water as long as the use is reasonable and does not
tend to injure or damage other riparian owners.” Id. at 575. Riparian landowners have a
vested interest in the prospective reasonable use of the stream . . . [for the] heart
of the riparian right is the right to assert a use at any time as long as it does not
harm another riparian who has a corresponding right. Further, yesterday’s
reasonable use by one riparian may become unreasonable tomorrow when a
fellow riparian owner asserts a new or expanded use.
Id. at 577. So, “the common-law riparian right . . . places no stock in the fact of past use,
present use, or even non-use.” Id. “[A] perfected appropriative right is a vested right which
may not be permanently divested except for nonuse . . . but is subject to senior appropriative
rights and reasonable riparian uses during times of shortage.” Id. at 571 (emphasis added).
Should a riparian owner assert [his or her] vested right to initiate a reasonable
use of the stream, and should the water in the stream be insufficient to supply
that owner’s reasonable use, we hold that the appropriator with the last priority
must either release water into the stream . . . or stop diverting an amount
sufficient to supply the riparian owner’s reasonable use . . . .
Id. at 582.
45. Id. at 576.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing C. C. Julian Oil & Royalties Co. v. Capshaw, 292 P. 841 (Okla. 1930)).
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extracting them) in a manner that obligated it to pay compensation,49 the
Court jumped to the conclusion that the 1963 water reforms
unconstitutionally “abolish[ed] the right of the riparian owner to assert [his
or her] vested interest in the prospective reasonable use of the stream” 50
The jump to the conclusion that the 1963 water reforms
unconstitutionally took a vested property right away from riparian
landowners without compensation was a large and abrupt leap of logic. So
the Court proceeded with a discussion designed to demonstrate that the
1963 water reforms no longer permitted riparian landowners to do all of
things they were permitted to do under the common-law riparian rights
system.51
Thus, the Court complained that under the 1963 water reforms “[t]he
riparian owner[] stands on equal footing with [the appropriator, and his]
ownership of riparian land affords [him] no right to the stream water except
for limited domestic use.”52 The Court was also distressed that after the
1963 water reforms riparian landowners could initiate new or expanded
non-domestic uses only as an appropriator, which meant that their uses are
“not judged by [their] reasonableness but only by [their] priority in time.”53
Finally, the Court was displeased that the appropriation process conditioned
the riparian landowner’s ability to get a water right on whether water was
available and provided him with water rights that were lower in priority
than all previous uses and subject to a quantified maximum use limitation.54
From its discussion of how the 1963 water reforms changed the means
by which riparian landowners could acquire stream water for non-domestic
uses, it is clear that the reforms did not deny riparian landowners all access
to water from the streams abutting their land. Riparian landowners retained
the right to take, at any time, water from the streams abutting their property
to support domestic uses,55 and those domestic uses retained priority over
all other stream water uses.56 Riparian landowners also had the opportunity
49. Id. (citing Frost v. Ponca City, 541 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1975)).
50. Id. at 577.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 60 (2011); 82 OKLA. STAT. §§ 105.1 (2), 105.1(A), 105.2(A)
(2011).
56. To that end, the 1963 water reform exempted domestic uses from the appropriation
priority system. Act of June 10, 1963, ch. 205, § 2(a), 1963 Okla. Sess. Laws 268 (codified
as 82 OKLA. STAT. § 105.2(A)). In 1993, after the Franco-American decision was finalized,
Oklahoma enacted a new provision declaring that the enactment of the 1963 water reforms
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to convert their existing non-domestic uses into vested water rights with
highly favorable priority dates.57 Most importantly, riparian landowners
shared with other Oklahomans in need of water the right to initiate new
non-domestic uses of stream water under prior appropriation rules designed
to protect the integrity of existing water uses and insure that Oklahoma
stream water supports only beneficial uses.58
Given that riparian landowners continued to have ample means for
obtaining stream water for non-domestic uses, it is hard to understand how
the case of a city taking and selling hydrocarbons located beneath the land
of private persons furnishes support for the conclusion that the 1963 water
reforms took a vested property interest from riparian landowners. In fact,
the effects the 1963 water reforms had upon riparian landowners’ right to
use stream water for non-domestic uses is much more analogous to the case
involving the regulation of the means of extracting hydrocarbons. The
regulation of the means of extracting hydrocarbons merely changed the way
mineral owners could extract hydrocarbons, just as the 1963 water reforms
merely changed the way riparian landowners could obtain stream water for
non-domestic uses from streams abutting their land. The Court wrote
made sure that the appropriation system does not interfere with riparian domestic uses. Act
of June 7, 1993, ch. 310, § 1, 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws 1625 (codified as 82 OKLA. STAT. §
105.1(A)).
57. Act of June 10, 1963, § 2(b) (priority determinations), modified by Act of Apr. 7,
1972, ch. 256, § 2(B), 1972 Okla. Sess. Laws 593-94 (codified with modifications as 82
OKLA. STAT. § 105.2(B) (2001)); Act of June 10, 1963, § 10 (vested rights determination
process).
58. For purposes of determining who gets to appropriate stream water, the 1963 water
reforms declared that “[b]eneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of the
right to the use of water . . . .” Act of June 10, 1963, § 2(a) (codified as 82 OKLA. STAT. §
105.2(A)). To protect existing beneficial uses, the 1963 water reforms stated that “[p]riority
in time shall give the better right.” Id. § 2(b) (codified as 82 OKLA. STAT. § 105.2(B)). In
1972, Oklahoma enacted a provision governing the process for deciding whether a person
should receive a permit to appropriate water from a stream that requires the OWRB to
determine whether “[t]here is unappropriated water available . . . [t]he applicant has a
present or future need for the water . . . the use to which the applicant intends to put the
water is a beneficial use; [and the] proposed use does not interfere with domestic or existing
appropriative uses.” Act of Apr. 7, 1972 § 12(1)-(3) (codified as 82 OKLA. STAT. §
105.12(A)(1)-(3) (Supp. 2010)). In 1993, after Franco-American was finalized, Oklahoma
enacted a new provision declaring that the purpose of the 1963 water reforms was “to
provide for stability and certainty in water rights by replacing the incompatible dual systems
of riparian and appropriative water rights . . . with an appropriation system of regulation
requiring the beneficial use of water and providing that priority in time shall give the better
right.” Act of June 7, 1993, ch. 310, § 1, 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws 1625 (codified as 82 OKLA.
STAT. § 105(1)(A)).
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approvingly of its decision that regulating the means of extracting
hydrocarbons does not take a mineral owner’s property without just
compensation59 and it should have used that decision as precedent for
upholding the validity of the 1963 water reforms.60
Not only is the Court’s taking decision not supported by its own
rationale, as will be shown below it is greatly at variance with the
normative taking analysis used to decide whether government regulatory
action has taken a person’s property without compensation. Prohibitions
against taking private property for a government purpose without
compensation “‘bar[s] Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public at large.’”61 Not surprisingly then, the tests developed by the United
States Supreme Court for determining when government regulation or
action takes private property focus “directly upon the severity of the burden
that government imposes upon private property rights.”62
Government regulation constitutes a taking per se if it results the
“owner . . . suffer[ing] a permanent physical invasion of her property,”63
either by the government itself or some third party.64 Government
regulation that deprives the owner of all economic use of his property also
constitutes a taking per se.65 Less extreme forms of government regulation
are assessed to see if they constitute a taking through “ad hoc factual
inquiries” employing such factors as the degree of economic impact on the
owner’s property, “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations,” and “the character of the
government action.”66
The 1963 water reforms did not affect the property of riparian
landowners in ways that constitute takings per se. Neither government nor
private parties were authorized to occupy physically anyone’s riparian land.
Riparian landowners were not restricted in the uses to which they could put
their land, and they retained the ability to secure water for domestic and
non-domestic uses on their riparian land. So, the 1963 water reforms did not
59. Franco American, 855 P.2d at 576.
60. See id. at 582-83, 593-94 (Lavender, J., dissenting).
61. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (quoting Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
62. Id. at 539.
63. Id. at 538.
64. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426-31, 435-38
(1982).
65. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-19 (1992).
66. Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss4/1

2012]

OKLAHOMA WATER RIGHTS: WHAT GOOD ARE THEY?

485

deprive riparian landowners of all economic use of their riparian land.
Moreover, it is difficult to make the case that riparian landowners suffered a
significant loss in the value of their riparian land because they were forced
to seek water for new or expanded non-domestic uses through the prior
appropriation system.
Under the appropriation system, riparian landowners can appropriate
stream water for new or expanded uses by showing the OWRB that their
proposed uses are beneficial (i.e., they have social and/or economic
value),67 there is enough unappropriated water to meet their needs,68 and the
proposed uses will not interfere with existing domestic and appropriative
uses.69 Once riparian landowners have successfully appropriated water for
a beneficial use, they may maintain their uses unless during times of water
shortage all the remaining water must be devoted to satisfying the needs of
domestic users and senior appropriators.70 Should circumstances other than
water shortage force the riparian landowner to discontinue using all or part
of his appropriative entitlement, he may resume using his full entitlement
again unless his entitlement has been forfeited in whole or in part due seven
continuous years of non-use.71
In contrast, under the dual rights system riparian landowners can initiate
new or expanded uses at any time they choose, without having to seek
67. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 105.12(A)(2) (Supp. 2010). Oklahoma has identified particular
uses that are deemed to be beneficial, and the nature of the uses so-identified confirms that
beneficial uses are those that support uses that generate economic or social value. Beneficial
use is defined by the OWRB as
the use of such quantity of stream or groundwater when reasonable intelligence
and reasonable diligence are exercised in its application for a lawful purpose
and as is economically necessary for that purpose. Beneficial uses include but
are not limited to municipal, industrial, agricultural, irrigation, recreation, fish
and wildlife, etc.
OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 785:20-1-2 (2011). Consistent with this definition, the OWRB has
declared that the
purposes for which the public waters of this State may be appropriated are
agriculture, irrigation, mining, drilling of oil and gas wells, recovery of oil and
gas, milling, manufacturing, power production, industrial purposes, the
construction and operation of water works for cities and towns, stock raising,
public parks, game management areas, propagation and utilization of fishery
resources, recreation, housing developments, pleasure resorts, artificial
recharge of a groundwater basin or subbasin or any other beneficial uses.
Id. § 785:20-1-5(a).
68. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 105.12(A)(1).
69. Id. § 105.12(A)(3).
70. Id. § 105.2(A)-(B).
71. Id. § 105.17(B).
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permission from the OWRB, by diverting water from streams abutting their
land.72 These uses can be initiated successfully and maintained indefinitely
as long as there is enough water available to satisfy the needs of all persons
taking water from the stream.73 If water is in short supply, water will be
denied only to those whose uses are determined in district court not to be
reasonable after comparing the relative merits of all existing uses.74 If there
is still not enough water after unreasonable uses are curtailed, appropriators
will be curtailed in accordance with the seniority of the their appropriation
rights,75 and then the remaining shortage, if any, will be borne proportionately by all reasonable riparian uses.76
When water is available to cover all existing and prospective uses, the
only economic disadvantage imposed on riparian landowners by the
appropriation system is the expense associated with the necessity to seek
OWRB permission to initiate a new or expanded use. Given the
expansiveness of Oklahoma’s definition of beneficial use,77 riparian
landowners’ uses will rarely be deemed not to be beneficial. Given the
volume of water usually available in Oklahoma streams, their proposed
uses should rarely be found to interfere with existing uses. Riparian
landowners will be subject to having their appropriative rights extinguished
for non-use, but it should be rare that they would be unable to use all or part
of their appropriative entitlement for seven continuous years. In the event
that they did lose their appropriative right for non-use, they will be
obligated to seek permission from the OWRB to commence the use again.
72. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 577
(Okla. 1990).
73. Id. at 575, 577 (emphasizing that riparian uses can be maintained as long as they do
not injure or interfere with the uses of other riparian landowners; it is mainly during times of
water shortage that one riparian use will interfere with another).
74. Id. at 578 (adopting what the court characterizes as the Nebraska approach of
determining the “rights of the riparian owner and the appropriator . . . by relative
reasonableness”).
75. Id. at 571 (stating that appropriative rights are “subject to senior appropriative rights
and reasonable riparian uses during shortages”). Also, the court emphasized that junior
appropriators must make way for new or expanded reasonable uses if there is not enough
water to accommodate them. Id. at 582.
76. The court did not address this contingency, but support for the idea that reasonable
riparian uses share the burdens of water shortage comes from the tendency of courts in
western states to resolve disputes among riparian irrigators during times of shortage by
“ordering the sharing of the shortage in proportion to some common measure of use . . . .” 1
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.03(c)(1) at 7-92, 7-93 (Amy K. Kelly ed., LexisNexis 3d
ed. 2007) [hereinafter WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 2007 ED.].
77. 82 Okla. Stat. § 105.17(B) (2011).
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It is difficult to assess in the abstract whether the appropriation system
imposes economic disadvantages on riparian landowners during time when
water is in short supply. Their domestic uses have the highest priority and
therefore receive water before all other uses, just as they do under the dual
rights system. Their non-domestic uses receive water in accordance to their
seniority, which means that during times of water shortage only the most
junior non-domestic water uses will be subject to curtailment in whole or in
part.
Given the difficulty in assessing the relative risks that a riparian
landowner would have his non-domestic use curtailed during times of water
shortage, it is unlikely that the value of his riparian land would be
diminished significantly or at all simply because his right to initiate new or
expanded non-domestic uses was made subject to the rules of the
appropriation system. The appropriation system’s first-in-time, first-inright principle would impose an economic loss on a riparian landowner
with a junior water right only if that use would have been deemed by a
court to be reasonable relative to the value of all other existing uses
competing for scarce water supplies and if there would have been enough
water to satisfy all reasonable riparian uses. Otherwise, the junior water use
that would be curtailed under the appropriation system’s first-in-time, firstin-right rationing principle would also have been curtailed in whole or in
part under the dual rights system revived by Franco-American because it
either would be deemed to be unreasonable or it would have to share the
water shortage with all other reasonable riparian uses.
In fact, when there is not enough water to satisfy all reasonable riparian
uses, the dual rights system’s method of rationing water during times of
shortage will cause partial curtailment of reasonable riparian water uses
with enough seniority to receive their full entitlement under the
appropriation system’s first-in-time, first-in-right rationing principle.
Under the appropriation system, a use deemed to be beneficial at the time it
was approved by the OWRB will not be subject to a reconsideration of its
beneficial use designation during times of shortage. However, under the
dual rights system this same beneficial use could be curtailed despite its
seniority because its reasonableness, which is measured against the relative
value of other competing uses, is subject to reconsideration when
conditions on the stream change.
In sum, the Court erred in holding that the 1963 water reforms
unconstitutionally took property from riparian landowners. Its rationale
does not support that holding. The reforms did not impose burdens on the
ability of riparian landowners to derive value from the use of their riparian
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land that are severe enough to constitute an unconstitutional taking as
measured by normative takings standards established by the United States
Supreme Court. Not surprisingly, then, the Franco-American decision is
also at odds with case law from six former dual rights states—Kansas,
North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington—that upheld
the constitutionality of legislation designed to transform a dual rights steam
water system into one dominated by the appropriation doctrine in the wake
of assertions that the transformation unconstitutionally took property from
riparian landowners.78
C. The Dual Rights System’s Operational Characteristics
Having revived Oklahoma’s dual rights regime, the Court then felt
compelled to offer a means of reconciling what it acknowledged was a
regime consisting of two “theoretically irreconcilable” water rights
systems.79 To that end, the Court announced that “the modified commonlaw riparian right is the controlling norm of law in Oklahoma” and “the
statutory right to appropriate stream water coexists with, but does not
preempt or abrogate, the riparian owner’s common-law right.”80
Accordingly, reasonable non-domestic riparian uses were given priority

78. Specifically, the legislation approved by the supreme courts of these states created
mechanisms for providing riparian landowners with vested rights comparable to
appropriative rights for their current riparian uses and required them to seek appropriation
rights for new or expanded uses after a certain date specified in the legislation. The Kansas
cases are F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d 1164, 1169-70 (Kan. 1981) (upholding
the abolishment of the overlying landowner entitlement to use groundwater beneath his land
comparable to the entitlement of landowners to use water from streams abutting their land),
Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 594-95 (Kan. 1962) (also an overlying landowner
case), and Kansas ex rel. Emery v. Knapp, 207 P.2d 440, 447-48 (Kan. 1949) (a riparian
rights case). The North Dakota case is Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 P.2d 728, 732-33 (N.D.
1968). The Oregon case is In re Determination of Water Rights of Hood River, 227 P. 1065,
1086-87 (Or. 1924). The South Dakota cases are Belle Fourche Irrigation District v. Smiley,
204 N.W.2d 105, 107-08 (S.D. 1973), and Belle Fourche Irrigation District v. Smiley, 176
N.W.2d 239, 243-46 (S.D. 1973). The Texas cases are In re Adjudication of the Water
Rights of the Upper Guadalupe Segment of the Guadalupe River Basin, 642 P.2d 438, 44446 (Tex. 1982), and In re Adjudication of Water Rights in the Llano River Watershed of the
Colorado River, 642 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tex. 1982). The Washington case is In re
Determination of Rights to the Use of Surface Waters of the Deadman Creek Drainage Basin
in Spokane County, 694 P.2d 1071, 1075-77 (Wash. 1985).
79. Franco-American, 855 P.2d at 572, 572 n.15 (acknowledging that all but two of the
nine dual rights states had “since adopted the appropriation doctrine as controlling all rights
to stream water”).
80. Id. at 575-76.
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over all appropriative uses.81 Riparian landowners may at any time initiate
new or expanded non-domestic uses.82 With respect to initiating and
maintaining non-domestic uses, riparian landowner’s are exempt from
being subject to a fixed quantification of their riparian entitlement,83 having
their right to continue their uses in times of shortage decided by the
appropriation system’s first-in-right, first-in-time priority principle,84 and
having their entitlement to use stream water extinguished for non-use.85
When riparian uses conflict with appropriative uses, “the rights of the
riparian owner and the appropriator are to be determined by relative
reasonableness.”86 If a riparian landowner seeks an appropriation permit,
he will be deemed to have relinquished his common-law riparian rights.87
D. The Instability & Uncertainty of Oklahoma Water Rights
Prior to the adoption of the 1963 water reforms, Oklahoma was not
making adequate progress in developing beneficial water uses.88 Many
observers believed this was attributable to Oklahoma’s system of
maintaining two incompatible water law systems coupled with Court
opinions that negated the usefulness of the appropriation system.89 Little
wonder then that the dual rights system revived by Franco-American has
been treated with hostility by the legislature and applied with uncertainty
and error by courts. Its operating characteristics make the effective
administration of Oklahoma water rights exceedingly difficult, and they
contain the seeds of immense water rights dysfunction in the form of the
normative standards for assessing the relative reasonableness of conflicting
water uses.
In response to the Franco-American decision, late in the 1993 legislative
session the Oklahoma legislature enacted a statute, which the Governor
signed into law, repudiating it. This statute states that:
It is the intent of the Oklahoma Legislature that the purpose of
Section 105.1 through Section 105.32 of this title is to provide
for stability and certainty in water rights by replacing the
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 571, 582.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 573, 577.
Id. at 577.
Id.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 571.
See Rarick, Pre-1963 Period, supra note 6, at 1-3.
Id.
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incompatible dual systems of riparian and appropriative water
rights which governed the use of water from definite streams in
Oklahoma prior to June 10, 1963, with an appropriation system
of regulation requiring the beneficial use of water and providing
that priority in time shall give the better right. These sections are
intended to provide that riparian landowners may use water for
domestic uses and store water in definite streams and that
appropriations shall not interfere with such domestic uses, to
recognize through administrative adjudications all uses, riparian
and appropriative, existing prior to June 10, 1963, and to
extinguish future claims to use water, except for domestic use,
based only on ownership of riparian lands.90
Despite being a legislative attempt to overturn a constitutional holding of
the Oklahoma State Supreme Court,91 this statute is still on the books.
What is not in the official Oklahoma Statutes is any mention of FrancoAmerican, so readers of the notes following the current versions of sections
comprising the 1963 water reforms would never know that these sections
had been declared unconstitutional.92
The Oklahoma Supreme Court remanded the Franco-American case
back to the trial court for a determination of the reasonableness of all the
riparian uses that were asserted by the riparian landowners who opposed
Ada’s attempt to appropriate more water from Byrds Mill Spring.93
Unfortunately, the trial judge clearly was not comfortable making this
determination, and so he remanded the proceedings to the OWRB for
purposes of taking evidence and formulating findings of fact and
conclusions of law with respect to the reasonableness of the riparian uses.94
The remand was in vain, because the OWRB Hearing Examiner concluded
that that under Oklahoma Law he had to honor the legislative statement
90. Act of June 7, 1993, ch. 310, § 1, 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws 1625 (codified as 82
OKLA. STAT. § 105(1)(A)).
91. See Heldermon v. Wright, 152 P.3d 855, 858, 859, 859 n.21 (Okla. 2006).
92. For the following sections, Franco-American is cited in the construction notes on
Lexis but not in Oklahoma Statutes. See notes following title 60, section 60 at 4 OKLA.
STAT. §§ 7194, 7195 (2001); title 82, sections 105.1, 105.2, 105.11, 105.15, 105.17, 105.18
at 6 OKLA. STAT. 10263, 10265, 10267-10269 (2001); title 82, sections 105.5, 105.12 at 4
OKLA. STAT. 1274, 1275 (Supp. 2010).
93. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 577-78
(Okla. 1990).
94. Letter from Jerry Barnett, OWRB Staff Attorney and Hearing Examiner, to the
Honorable Doug Gabbard, II, District Judge for Coal County (Aug. 2, 1994).
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expressed in title 82, section 105.1A of the Oklahoma Statutes that the 1963
water reforms were still valid.95 Accordingly, he refused to make the
reasonableness determinations requested by the district court.96
In 2005, a case arose between two riparian landowners who did not have
appropriative rights that had the potential for providing the Oklahoma
Supreme Court with the opportunity to reconsider its Franco-American
decision.97 Unfortunately, the case, Heldermon v. Wright,98 was dismissed
by the Oklahoma Supreme Court due to a fatal procedural error, and so the
constitutional issues were not resolved.99 However, as discussed below, the
case illustrates both the continuing hostility toward Franco-American and
the difficulty courts have in correctly following Franco-American’s water
rights management rules and the chaos those rules impose on Oklahoma
water users.
The downstream riparian landowner (Heldermon) was using water from
an unnamed stream to support livestock operations.100 These uses were
deemed to require water beyond what would be needed to support domestic
needs, so the downstream riparian’s use was for non-domestic purposes.101
The upstream riparian (Wright) sought to dam the stream for purposes of
creating a lake to support recreation, fish and wildlife.102
Concerned that the upstream riparian’s lake project would harm his
livestock operations, the downstream riparian sued for injunctive relief and
a declaration that he was entitled to have the upstream riparian release all of
the water needed to support his current livestock operations.103 He did so
after the OWRB had granted the upstream riparian a permit to construct a
dam sufficient to store water in the volume necessary to support two years
of domestic water needs (estimated to be 23 AF) and required the upstream
riparian to release all water in excess of that amount downstream for the

95. Hearing Examiner’s Pre-hearing Conference Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Report to District Court at 4, 5, In re Remand of Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v.
OWRB, No. C-81-23, Okla. Water Res. Bd. (Aug. 2, 1994).
96. Id. at 5.
97. Heldermon v. Wright, 152 P.3d 855, 859 (Okla. 2006) (validity of Franco-American
challenged by the legislature and the Oklahoma Attorney General but defended by
Heldermon).
98. 152 P.3d 855.
99. Id. at 859, 860.
100. Heldermon v. Wright, No. 100,709, at 3 (Okla. Civ. App., Apr. 9, 2006).
101. Heldermon, 152 P.3d at 858; Heldermon, No. 100,709, at 11, 12.
102. Heldermon, 152 P.3d at 857.
103. Heldermon, No. 100,709, at 6, 7, 13-15.
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benefit of downstream water users.104 Included in the calculation of the
water Heldermon desired was a 500 to 750 gallons per minute flow he
asserted was necessary to perform “the vital functions of ‘sweeping’ or
‘scouring’ the banks and stream bed, making the stream’s deep pools, and
‘charging’ or saturating the banks with water . . .”105
Given the nature of the parties’ uses, the case could be considered one
pitting a new upstream riparian domestic use against an existing
downstream riparian non-domestic use. Alternatively, if one focused on the
recreational, fish and wildlife purposes of the upstream riparian’s use, the
case could be considered one pitting a new upstream riparian non-domestic
use against an existing downstream riparian non-domestic use. The second
alternative may be the most fitting, because despite the OWRB order the
lake the upstream riparian sought to create had a 700 AF storage
capacity.106
Invoking the mandate of title 82, section 105.1(A) of the Oklahoma
Statutes, the provision expressing the State of Oklahoma’s hostility to the
Franco-American decision,107 the district court ordered the upstream
riparian to release enough water to support all of the downstream riparian’s
uses, including the flow needed to “scour” and “charge” the stream, which
the court deemed to be domestic uses.108 Not wishing to release this much
water, the upstream riparian appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Civil
Appeals.109
The civil appeals court found that the downstream riparian’s uses were
beyond the scope of Oklahoma’s definition of domestic use, and therefore it
treated these uses as non-domestic uses.110 It also held that, under FrancoAmerican, the downstream riparian was entitled to make reasonable nondomestic use of stream water without obtaining an appropriative right, and
therefore title 82, sections 105.1A, 105.2 A of the Oklahoma Statutes were
unconstitutional.111 Then, the civil appeals court upheld the district court’s
holding as to the amount of water the upstream riparian had to release on
grounds that this amount was necessary to support the downstream

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Heldermon, 152 P.3d at 857-58.
Heldermon, No. 100,709, at 14-15.
Id. at 4 n.1.
Supra note 90 & accompanying text.
Heldermon, No. 100,709, at 9, 10.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 11-12.
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riparian’s reasonable non-domestic use.112 In doing so, the civil appeals
court simply treated the downstream riparian use as reasonable without
employing the factors the Oklahoma Supreme Court said in FrancoAmerican should be used in determining the reasonableness of a water
use.113 Moreover, it stated that as between riparian owners the test of
reasonableness is whether one owner’s water use would materially injure
the other owner’s water use.114 As a consequence, it seemed to infer that
the upstream riparian’s water use would be unreasonable if he released less
water than he was ordered to release by the district court.115
On appeal to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the upstream riparian
asserted that under Franco-American his use would be reasonable as long
as he released enough water so that downstream riparian uses would not be
materially injured, that the downstream riparian’s were limited by statutes
to using water only for domestic uses, and that those domestic uses would
be fully supported by much smaller releases than those ordered by the
district court and affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals.116 Invoking
Franco-American, the downstream riparian asserted that he had the right to
receive water in volumes sufficient to support his reasonable non-domestic
uses or, in the alternative, the amount of water he needed was within the
scope of Oklahoma’s definition of domestic use.117 The Oklahoma Attorney
General, several amici curiae, and the upstream riparian filed briefs arguing
that despite Franco-American the current Oklahoma Stream Water Use
Law is constitutional, and the downstream riparian filed a brief arguing that
this body of law is unconstitutional under Franco-American.118 After
characterizing the relevant provisions of the current Oklahoma Steam
Water Use Laws as a legislative expression of hostility toward FrancoAmerican,119 and noting that the parties had put the constitutionality of
these provisions and the continuing vitality of Franco-American into
question,120 the Oklahoma Supreme Court dismissed the case after finding
that the district court had committed a fatal procedural error by not

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 13-16.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 13-16.
Heldermon v. Wright, 152 P.3d 855, 857-58 (Okla. 2006).
Id.
Id. at 859.
Id. at 859 & n.20.
Id. at 857-59.
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notifying the OWRB that it was entertaining a lawsuit to adjudicate stream
water rights.121
At all levels, the Heldermon case was handled in ways inconsistent with
the water rights management principles handed down in Franco-American.
The district court either believed it was bound by the anti-Franco-American
statutory provision that required riparian owners to get appropriation
permits for their non-domestic uses, and therefore treated all of the
downstream riparian’s uses as domestic uses, or it just could not apply
correctly Oklahoma’s domestic use definition. Having correctly found that
the anti-Franco-American statutory provisions were unconstitutional
attempts to defy Franco-American’s mandates, the Court of Civil Appeals
mischaracterized Franco-American’s standard for assessing the
reasonableness of water uses and thus failed utterly to apply any of the
reasonableness factors Franco-American mandated.
Both courts in essence gave the downstream riparian the benefit of the
appropriation doctrine’s first-in-time, first-in-right priority principle by
summarily subjecting the upstream riparian’s new use to limitations
designed to protect fully the downstream riparian’s use. By doing so, the
courts failed to assess first the relative reasonableness of both uses before
determining which use should be adjusted or prohibited. As a consequence,
they failed to comply with Franco-American’s mandate that all riparian
uses are co-equal and should be judged on the basis of their relative
reasonableness rather than by a time-based priority principle.
Having set the stage for a possibly decisive decision as to the continuing
vitality of Franco-American, the Oklahoma Supreme Court concocted a
flimsy procedural excuse for ducking the opportunity to rectify the chaos
caused by its Franco-American decision. It found that a statute requiring
the Oklahoma Attorney General to intervene in lawsuits asserting the
impairment of water rights if the OWRB notifies him that the public interest
would be best served by his intervention to implicitly require parties to
notify the OWRB of such lawsuits. It then dismissed the Heldermon case
despite the active participation of the Oklahoma Attorney General.
To fully appreciate the chaos caused by Franco-American, it is important
to understand why all the uncertainty created by the simple conflict
presented in Heldermon would have been avoided under the prior
appropriation doctrine. Without Franco-American, it is quite likely
Heldermon would have sought and received a permit to appropriate water
from the unnamed creek to support a beneficial use—his cattle operations.
121. Id. at 859-60.
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If so, his permit would have specified exactly how much water Heldermon
needed to support his beneficial use. Wright also would have sought a
permit to appropriate water from the unnamed creek to support a beneficial
use—the lake dedicated to recreation, wildlife and fish. When he did, he
would be entitled only to the water still available from the unnamed creek
after Heldermon fully exercised his senior appropriative right.
Alternatively, if Heldermon erroneously believed his cattle operations
constituted only domestic uses, he would not have sought an appropriative
permit. Then, if Wright did seek an appropriative permit, he would be
entitled to receive a senior water right to all the water necessary to support
his lake less any water Heldermon actually needed for legitimate domestic
uses. All of Heldermon’s non-domestic uses would be invalid until he
obtained an appropriation permit, and then they would junior and
subordinate to Wright’s permitted uses.
Under either of the scenarios discussed above, the appropriative water
rights obtained by the parties would fail to provide them with the water they
desired only when there was not enough water to support both uses or they
ran afoul of the use-it-or-lose it rule. If stream conditions changed, neither
party would face the risk of losing all or part of his right to use water as a
result of the other party being allowed to question the continued
reasonableness of his use. Both of their uses would have been deemed
beneficial during the appropriation permitting process, and those findings
would not be subject to latter day attacks. Under the appropriation
doctrine’s first-in-time, first-in-right system, both parties would know
where they stood relative to each other in times of water shortage. As a
consequence, the junior appropriator’s investor expectations would be
tempered by the knowledge that in times of shortage he could face partial or
total loss of his right to use water from the stream. Faced with this risk, the
junior appropriator would seek to buy all or part of the senior appropriator’s
entitlement or seek water from another source or conform his use of water
to the anticipated fluctuations in water availability.
Unfortunately, as a result of Franco-American, the appropriation permit
cannot be a source of certainty or stability. All water uses supported by an
appropriation permit are subject to a judicial assessment of their continued
reasonableness relative to a conflicting riparian use. Worse yet, the
appropriation permit is a badge of inferiority. Any riparian landowner who
obtains one loses his riparian rights, and all reasonable appropriative uses
are subordinate to all reasonable riparian uses.
As documented above, Oklahoma courts have had difficulty dealing with
Franco-American’s command to judge the merits of water uses conflicting
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with any riparian water use on the basis of their relative reasonableness.
This may be due to the complexity of the factors the Franco-American
court mandated to be used to judge the reasonableness of conflicting water
uses. The mandate states that:
Reasonableness is a question of fact to be determined by the
court on a case-by-case basis. Factors courts consider in
determining reasonableness include the size of the stream,
custom, climate, season of the year, size of the diversion, place
and method of the diversion, type of use and its importance to
society (beneficial use), needs of other riparians, location of the
diversion on the stream, the suitability of the use to the stream,
and the fairness of requiring the user causing the harm to bear
the loss. See Restatement (Second) Torts § 850A [1979].122
Perhaps the Oklahoma lower courts’ difficulty in acknowledging and
using the Franco-American reasonableness factors is that the FrancoAmerican court stuck them in a footnote. The more likely problem is that
the Franco-American court did not provide any clues as to how a lower
court should apply the factors it mandated. State trial courts are not expert
agencies charged with managing the State’s water supplies, and the more
logistical factors mandated by the Franco-American court—size of stream,
size of the diversion, place and method of the diversion, type of use, its
importance to society (beneficial use), location of the diversion on the
stream, and the suitability of the use to the stream—are the type of factors
weighed by the OWRB, Oklahoma’s expert water management agency, in
determining whether to grant an applicant’s request for an appropriation
permit.123 It is therefore understandable why the trial judge who received
the Franco-American court’s mandate to judge the reasonableness of the
competing uses in the Franco-American case asked the OWRB to provide
him with findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the
reasonableness of those uses.124
In addition, the Franco-American court’s concern about shielding from
loss riparian landowners whose riparian water uses have been disrupted by
another water user conflicts with its obsession with having riparian uses
judged not by any time of initial use priority system but rather by the
122. Franco-American Charolaise Ltd., v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 576 n.40
(Okla. 1990).
123. See Application for Permit to Use Surface or Stream Water, http://www.owrb.ok.
gov/supply/watuse/pdf_wat/app_sw.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
124. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
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relative reasonableness of all conflicting uses. As noted previously, the
Franco-American court insisted that
• “the last riparian use asserted has as much priority as the first . . . ,125
• “yesterday’s reasonable use by one riparian owner may become
unreasonable tomorrow when a fellow riparian owner asserts a
new or expanded use,”126 and
• the riparian landowner should not be denied the right to initiate a
new or expanded use because there is not enough water to satisfy
all existing uses, because “the very nature of the common-law
riparian right . . . places no stock in the fact of past use, present
use, or even non-use.”127
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that a riparian landowner who
initiates a new use or expands an existing one that interferes with an
existing riparian use is a harm doer who should either not be allowed to
continue his new or expanded use or expand a use to the extent that it
impedes an existing use or be required to compensate the person whose
existing use was compromised.128 Acceptance of this conclusion virtually
ratifies the Appropriation Doctrine’s first-in-time, first-in-right principle in
contradiction to the Franco-American court’s insistence that riparian uses
should not be accorded any preference on the basis of their seniority. In
effect, this is precisely what the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals did in
Heldermon by protecting Heldermon’s existing riparian use against
Wright’s attempt to initiate a new riparian use.129
Oklahoma water users would suffer even greater instability and
uncertainty if the Franco-American court’s insistence that the last riparian
use has the same priority as the first and that yesterday’s reasonable use
could tomorrow be declared unreasonable became the norms for handling
conflicting water uses. As was stated in the comments to section 850A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which specifies factors to be applied in
determining the reasonableness of the use of water, “the law of resource use
generally follows a strong policy of encouraging enterprise and
development and implements the policy with a system of property rights
125. Franco-American, 855 P.2d at 572.
126. Id. at 577.
127. Id.
128. In fact, the Franco-American court also opined that “[t]he heart of the riparian right
is the right to assert a use at any time as long as it does not harm another riparian who has a
corresponding right.” Id. (emphasis added).
129. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
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that give some reasonable assurance that the activity will not be subject to
premature termination without compensation.”130 The Franco-American
court’s reasonableness mandates do not follow this policy. They require
courts to consider whether a current water user should be prohibited from
continuing his once reasonable water use because it has become
unreasonable after the initiation of a new or expanded uses. Such an
outcome would inflict on the unfortunate water user uncompensated losses
of investments he made in reliance on the now extinguished water use.131
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A cmt. k (1979).
131. For examples of cases that produced such distressing results, see Joslin v. Marin
Municipal Water District, 429 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1967), and Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129
(Ark. 1955).
Joslin had operated a rock and gravel business on his riparian land for seven years. Joslin,
429 P.2d at 891. This business was made possible by the flow of Nicasio Creek depositing
rock, sand, and gravel on Joslin’s land, and it contributed about $250,000 in value to Joslin’s
land. Id. Then, in the spring of 1962, the Marin Municipal Water District dammed the
Creek above Joslin’s property in order to store water for municipal water supply purposes in
accordance with an appropriation permit it had received from the California Water Rights
Board. Id. at 891. As a result, the flow of the Creek was so diminished that rocks and gravel
were no longer deposited on Joslin’s land. Id. Joslin sued the District, contending its new
use interfered with his rightful riparian rights and therefore it should pay him for the lost
value of his land. Id. at 891, 896-97. The trial court, however, granted summary judgment
in favor of the District on grounds that the District had not violated any of Joslin’s
substantive rights. Id. at 891. The California Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s
summary judgment on the basis that it was not “‘reasonable’ . . . that the riches of our
streams . . . are to be dissipated in the amassing of mere sand and gravel which for aught that
appears subserves no public policy.” Id. at 895.
Brooks had leased land riparian to Horseshoe Lake (the Lake) on which he had
intermittently irrigated crops with water pumped from the Lake for over twenty years.
Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Ark. 1955); see 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 2007
ED., supra note 75, § 7.02(d)(2) at 7-60. Prior to the 1954 growing season, Harris’s lessee
began a fishing and boat rental business using a small camp site that was on land riparian to
the Lake. Harris, 283 S.W.2d at 131. Within two months, Brooks began irrigating a rice
crop by pumping water from the Lake in the same amount that he had pumped in recent
growing seasons. Id. at 130-31. About forty-five days later, Harris and his lessee sued
Brooks seeking to enjoin him from pumping water from the Lake because the water levels in
the Lake were diminished to the point that the Lake was no longer suitable for fishing and
boating. Id. Despite the lawsuit, Brooks continued to irrigate his rice crop for another forty
days and quit only after being informed by the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission that
the Lake’s water levels were now so low that fish life was endangered. Id. at 131. The
Chancellor refused to issue the injunction and did not issue findings of fact or law. Id. On
appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the Chancellor, finding that Brook’s pumping
water from the Lake became unreasonable when the water levels reached its normal level of
189.67 feet because at that level his continued pumping unreasonably interfered with the
fishing and boating operation. Id. at 135-36. In doing so, the court cited the precedent of a
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Another potential source of confusion is the Franco-American court’s
very puzzling citation to section 850A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
as support for its mandated reasonableness factors. At minimum, this
citation is inapt because the reasonableness factors set forth in section 850A
are significantly different than the Franco-American factors.
The
Restatement factors are:
(a) The purpose of the use;
(b) the suitability of the use to the watercourse or lake;
(c) the economic value of the use;
(d) the social value of the use;
(e) the extent and amount of harm that it does;
(f) the practicality of avoiding the harm by adjusting the use
or method of one proprietor or the other;
(g) the practicality of adjusting the quantity of water used by
each proprietor;
(h) the protection of existing values of water uses, land,
investments and enterprises; and
(i) the justice of requiring the user causing the harm to bear
the loss.132
Facially, there are loose similarities between the Franco-American
court’s logistical factors and section 850A(a)-(d). Similarly, the FrancoAmerican court’s concern for protecting riparian users from harm caused by
other users mirrors loosely section 850A(e)-(i). However, the purpose and
intended effects of section 850A’s reasonableness formulation refutes much
of the Franco-American court’s ideas about riparian rights. Specifically,
section 850A does not really make the test of reasonableness turn on the
relative values and merits of competing uses,133 it contemplates courts
Florida case, Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co., that was similar in all circumstances except for one
very important difference—the irrigator in Taylor was the new user and his irrigation
interfered with existing riparian uses. Id. (citing Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co., 46 So. 2d 392,
392-94 (Fla. 1950)); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS app. § 850A cmt. k, at 32 (1982).
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979).
133. To that end, section 850A’s commentator advocated a more objective determination
of reasonableness by applying factors (a)-(d) to the plaintiff’s use first and then to the
defendant’s without making relative comparisons of one use’s reasonableness to the other.
See id. § 850A cmts. a-f, at 221, 223-26 (stating that each use is subjected independently of
the other to an assessment of whether it meets section 850A’s factors a-d). Thus, the
commentator states that
[t]he typical case involves two riparians who are each making a beneficial use
by suitable means and are each producing desirable values” under conditions
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quantifying the amount of water riparians need to meet their needs in
contradiction to the Franco-American court’s proclamation that that
riparian rights cannot be “quantified in futuro,”134 and it promotes the
appropriation doctrine’s first-in-time, first-in-right priority principles.135
Even though the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals did not cite section
850A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in its Heldermon decision, it
produced an opinion and an outcome that was much more consistent with

where “both cannot be enjoyed . . . [because] one interferes with the other by
reduction the availability of water in the source or the opportunities for its
enjoyment.
Id. § 850A cmt. a, at 221. Under these circumstances, section 850A deems the interfering
use as unreasonable only if it causes serious harm to other users. Id. § 850A cmts. a, g, at
222, 226-27.
Regardless of the extent of harm, section 850A calls for attempts to reduce or eliminate it
by determining whether each user’s method of use is reasonable or is wasteful and
inefficient, and whether each user is using more water than is needed to support his use. Id.
§ 850A cmts. a, h-i, at 222, 227-31. Even if no adjustments of method or quantity of use can
reduce harm to a negligible level, section 850A still does not advocate determining who
should prevail by comparing the relative value of the conflicting uses. The commentary
states that “[w]hen this is the case, the controversy cannot be solved by a simple balancing
of the interests of the parties or by determining the relative values of the uses and awarding
the water to the user with the paramount interest or the better use.” Id. § 850A cmt. a, at
222. Instead, it encourages exploration of sharing the shortages on a proportionate basis
either in-kind or with payments to the users who suffer an inordinate reduction in water. Id.
§ 850A cmt. j, at 231-33. If sharing cannot solve the problem, then section 850A encourages
courts to protect existing values, id. § 850A cmts j, k at 232-35, and, in appropriate cases, do
so by allowing the interfering use to continue upon payment of reasonable compensation to
those whose uses were seriously compromised. Id. § 850A cmts. j, l, at 232, 235-37.
134. Compare id. § 850A cmt. i, at 230 (“In the interest of promoting certainty of
property rights, a court may quantify the riparian rights being litigated by allowing each
riparian proprietor to take a specific portion of the stream or a specific quantity of water.”),
with Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 573 (Okla.
1990) (“A riparian right is neither constant nor judicially quantifiable in futuro.”).
135. Thus, the commentator noted,
In the relatively rare cases in which demand has exceeded the supply to the
extent that the initiation of a new use has taken water from or caused
substantial harm to an existing use, most courts have applied the reasonable use
rule so as to give legal protection to the prior use.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A cmt. k, at 233-34. “Only a few courts have made
specific mention of the relative priority of uses, but it may be deduced from the results of the
cases that priority of use is an important factor in determining the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of a use of water . . . .” Id. at 234.
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section 850A’s approach to resolving conflicts among riparian water users
than it was with the approach called for by the Franco-American court.136
Finally, the Franco-American court’s insistence that riparian landowners
can initiate new or expanded riparian water uses without obtaining an
appropriation permit creates potential logistical problems for the OWRB as
it attempts to determine whether to grant appropriation permits to nonriparian landowners. The OWRB is required not to issue a permit if there is
not unappropriated water available or the proposed use will interfere with
domestic or existing appropriative uses.137 To the extent that riparian
landowners are maintaining non-domestic uses without appropriation
permits the OWRB will lack all the data it needs to determine accurately
the availability of water and the potential for a new appropriation use to
interfere with existing uses.
E. Solutions to the Dual/Riparian Rights Problem
The obvious solution to the instability and uncertainty created by
Franco-American is to set up a test case before the Oklahoma Supreme
Court through the application of a statute designed to conflict with FrancoAmerican’s revival of riparian rights. Using normative factors about when
a court should reconsider a prior precedent, Franco-American is ripe for
being overruled. As enunciated most famously in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,138 factors for supporting the
overruling of a precedent are:
• has the rule of the case proven to be unworkable;139
• has the rule of the case created such reliance that its overruling
would create significant hardship and inequity;140
• has the rule of the case been undermined by developments in
related principles of law;141
• have facts or perceptions of the facts changed so as to “rob[] the
old rule of significant application or justification.142
136. The opinion did not compare the relative values of each use, but rather focused like
a laser beam on establishing what limits needed to be placed on Wright’s use of the stream
water for fish, wildlife, and recreation purposes in order to preserve Heldermon’s preexisting cattle operations. Heldermon v. Wright, No. 100,709, at 3, 4, 13-16 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2006).
137. 82 OKLA. STAT. 105.12(A)(1), (3) (2011).
138. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
139. Id. at 854.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 855.
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It is clear from the previous discussion about the hostility of
Oklahoma’s elective branches toward Franco-American and the lower
courts’ difficulty in, or resistance to, following its mandates that
Franco-American’s mandates have defied practical workability.143 The
elected branches created law to repudiate Franco-American’s
mandates,144 and the courts have not applied its mandates.145
It is also clear that on the day Franco-American was decided its
mandates were already undermined by developments in related law, and
nothing has occurred to reverse this undermining. Franco-American was
an aberration because it condemned Oklahoma to be practically the only
dual rights state to suffer the judicial nullification of its attempt to cut-off
the right of riparian landowners to initiate new or expanded non-domestic
uses without an appropriation permit.146 The Franco-American court relied
heavily on the Nebraska case of Wasserburger v. Coffee147 as precedent for
nullifying Oklahoma’s water law reforms, but that case held that riparian
landowners possess riparian rights only if their riparian land
• passed into private ownership prior to April 4, 1895, the date
Nebraska statutorily dedicated the use of unappropriated stream
water to the people subject to appropriation; and
• retained its riparian status by continuing to abut a stream through
a unified chain of title dating back before April 4, 1895.148
As a result of these two requirements, it has been observed that “[r]iparian
rights created before April 4, 1895 still are . . . constitutionally protected . . .
but due to the limited number of riparian rights, they are primarily of
historical significance.”149

142. Id.
143. See supra Part I.D.
144. Act of June 7, 1993, ch. 310, § 1, 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws 1625 (codified as 82
OKLA. STAT. § 105(1)(A) (2011)).
145. Heldermon v. Wright, 152 P.3d 855 (Okla. 2006); Heldermon v. Wright, No.
100,709 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006); Letter from OWRB Staff Attorney and Hearing Examiner,
to the Honorable Doug Gabbard II, District Judge for Coal County (Aug. 2, 1994).
146. See discussion supra note 78 and accompanying text, citing cases from six former
dual rights states (Kansas, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas and Washington)
that upheld their transition from a dual rights state to a unified right state under the
Appropriation Doctrine.
147. 141 N.W.2d 738 (Neb. 1966).
148. Id. at 745.
149. Donald Blanenau, Nebraska, in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 771 (Robert E. Beck
ed., 2005) [hereinafter WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 2005 ED.].
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Even California, the western state most protective of common-law
riparian rights,150 has in the context of general stream adjudications
authorized subjecting any new and expanded riparian use occurring in the
future to a lower priority than all appropriation rights that preceded them in
time.151 It is also to be noted that even in many traditionally pure riparian
rights states, the uncertainty created by common-law riparian rights in the
wake of increasing pressures on water supplies have led to the adoption of
regulated riparianism,152 which requires riparian landowners to get permits
before initiating a new or expanded use,153 subjects the uses to
quantification,154 and in some states puts riparian uses on the same standing
as non-riparian uses.155
Events, or more properly the lack thereof, in the aftermath of the elected
branches creating law to repudiate Franco-American provide support for
asserting that Franco-American’s mandates have been reduced in
significance by changed facts and have not engendered significant reliance
among Oklahoma riparian landowners. As discussed previously, the
Oklahoma Legislature’s reaction and solution to Franco-American was
repudiate Franco-American by requiring riparian landowners to get
appropriation permits for their non-domestic uses.156 Since this antiFranco-American provision went into effect on June 7, 1993,157 the OWRB
has not received any complaints that a water user is suffering interference
with his water use because of an unpermitted water use by a riparian
landowner.158
The OWRB has granted numerous applications for
appropriation permits to secure water for irrigation projects since that
time.159 It is quite possible that a significant portion of those permits were
issued to riparian landowners.160 If so, under the Franco-American

150. Harrison C. Dunning, California, in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 2005 ED., supra
note 149, at 409.
151. In re Long Valley Creek, 599 P.2d 656 (Cal. 1979).
152. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 2007 ED., supra note 76, § 903 at 9-52.
153. Id. § 903(a), at 9-62 to 9-64.
154. Id. § 903(a)(5)(A), at 9-102 to 9-104.
155. Id. § 903(a)(2), at 9-69 to 9-72.
156. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 105.1(A) (2011). See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
157. Act of June 7, 1993, ch. 310, § 1, 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws 1625.
158. Phone Conversation with Dean Couch, General Counsel of the Oklahoma Water
Resources Board (Apr. 1, 2012).
159. Id.
160. Id.
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mandate these riparian landowners have relinquished their riparian rights.161
So, it is quite likely that a significant percent of riparian landowners using
stream water for non-domestic uses have already relinquished their riparian
water rights,162 and there may not be many riparian landowners left who
have made water use decisions in reliance on Franco-American’s mandates.
However, the lack of complaints about unpermitted riparian uses
interfering with other uses may simply be a function that enough water has
been available to prevent water use conflicts rather than proof there are
presently no riparian landowners using water for non-domestic purposes
without an appropriation permit.163 The Heldermon case shows that there
probably are some riparian landowners who are using stream water for nondomestic uses in reliance on Franco-American or may need to rely on
Franco-American because they erroneously believed that their uses are
domestic only.164
Given that there are probably some riparian landowners who have relied
or Franco-American in relation to current unpermitted water uses, or wish
to rely on Franco-American to validate making new and expanded water
uses, without an appropriation permit, the 1993 anti-Franco-American act
is not a good vehicle for creating a test case. It is just a barebones
repudiation of Franco-American and so it does not provide riparian
landowners with a safe harbor.
A more fair way to create a test case would be build off the 1993 antiFranco-American statute to enact another statute—The Joe Rarick
Memorial Appropriation Restoration Act (JRMARA)—designed to revive
the 1963 water reforms. This new act, which should be codified in title 60
as section 60A, should include the following elements:
• Legislative findings about how the dual rights system imposes
instability and uncertainty on all Oklahoma Water Users;165
161. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 571
(Okla. 1990).
162. The lack of complaints about unpermitted riparian uses interfering with other uses
may simply be a function that enough water has been available to prevent conflicts rather
than an indication that there are presently no riparian landowners using water for nondomestic purposes without an appropriation permit. Phone Conversation with Dean Couch,
supra note 158.
163. Id.
164. Heldermon v. Wright, 152 P.3d 855, 857-58 (Okla. 2006).
165. Suggested language for this section is as follows:
(a) It is the policy of this State to allocate Oklahoma stream water so as to
derive maximum beneficial use from it, including maximum health, safety,
social and economic benefits.
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A prohibition on all unpermitted non-domestic water uses after
the effective date of the statute;166
A grace period application process giving riparian landowners
who since 1962 have never used stream water for a nondomestic use under the authority of an appropriation permit the
opportunity, to the extent water is available and it can be done
without interfering with existing uses, to secure a permit for
current unpermitted domestic uses or for a new or expanded
non-domestic use that will provide them with a priority date
equal to the date they acquired title to or the right of possession
of the riparian land that qualifies them as riparian
landowners.167

(b) The Legislature finds that the continued co-existence of the Riparian
Doctrine and the Appropriation Doctrine makes it impossible to for Oklahoma
to derive maximum beneficial use from its stream water because it
(i) prevents Oklahoma from providing stable water rights with known
parameters by subjecting all water rights to unpredictable curtailment under the
Riparian Doctrine’s ever-shifting concept of reasonable use;
(ii) imposes the risk of costly and unnecessary stream wide judicial
determination of water rights whenever there is a conflict among existing water
users in order to determine the relative reasonableness of all uses;
(iii) impedes economic development and investment within Oklahoma that
is dependent upon securing stable supplies of water.
166. Suggested language for this provision is as follows:
(c) Therefore, after the effective date of this Act, riparian landowners may
neither initiate nor maintain non-domestic uses of water in streams bordering or
running through their riparian land unless they have secured an appropriation
permit in compliance with the grace period application process described in
Section 3 of this Act or pursuant to the appropriation laws contained in 82
Okla. Stat.
167. Suggested language for this provision is as follows:
(d) To the extent water is available, and it can be done without interfering
with current domestic and permitted uses, riparian landowners who have not
since 1962 used water from a stream for a non-domestic use under an
appropriation permit are eligible to receive vested water rights as follows: (1)
eligible riparian landowners shall be entitled to receive an appropriation permit
for any current unpermitted reasonable non-domestic riparian uses of water
from surface streams bordering or running through their land, (2) eligible
riparian landowners not currently making a non-domestic reasonable use of
water from streams bordering or running through their riparian land may
initiate such a use; (3) all vested rights granted shall have apriority date equal to
the date the recipient received legal title to, or valid possession of, their riparian
land; (4) to receive a vested rights permit, eligible riparian landowners must
apply for the permit within two years of the effective date of the Joe Rarick
Memorial Appropriation Act;
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• A provision directing the Oklahoma Water Resources Board give
all riparian landowners actual notice of this act and the grace
period application process it provides.168
By addressing the notice and investor expectation concerns, JRMARA
should have an excellent chance of being the vehicle for overturning
Franco-American, especially with respect to extinguishing the common-law
riparian right to initiate new or expanded uses outside of the appropriation
permitting system.
The recommended structure and substance of JRMARA addresses the
Franco-American court’s concerns about the 1963 water reforms not giving
riparian landowners adequate notice that their common-law riparian rights
were being limited and of their opportunity to convert existing riparian uses
into vested uses.169 All riparian landowners still eligible to assert commonlaw riparian rights will be given notice by mail of the express abrogation of
their common-law riparian rights and of their opportunities either to convert
existing unpermitted non-domestic riparian uses into vested rights or to
initiate a non-domestic riparian use and qualify it as a vested right. All
water users will be given notice of these changes through statutory
provision codified strategically immediately after title 60, section 60 of the
Oklahoma Statutes, the provision that conferred riparian rights on riparian
landowners.
JRMARA also is respectful of riparian landowners’ investor
expectations. Those who have not yet initiated a non-domestic riparian use
have two years to initiate a use deemed to be a vested right, and those
enjoying current unpermitted non-domestic riparian uses have an
opportunity to convert them into vested rights. Through the vested rights
proceeding, eligible riparian landowners will receive priority dates as of the
date they assumed the status of a riparian landowner through the purchase
or lease of riparian land even if they did not initiate a non-domestic use
168. Suggested language for this provision is as follows:
(e) The Oklahoma Water Resources Board is directed to send notice to all
riparian landowners by registered mail at their last known address of this
change in Riparian Water Law and of riparian landowner’s rights to receive
appropriation permits providing them with preferential priority dates equal to
the dates on which they acquired title to or right of possession of their riparian
land for current non-permitted reasonable uses or new reasonable uses from
water in streams bordering or running through their land if applications for
permits for said uses are filed with the Oklahoma Water Resources Board
within two years of the effective date of this Act.
169. For a discussion of these concerns, see Franco-American Charolaise Ltd. v. Okla.
Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 577 (Okla. 1990).
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until much later. In return for this favorable treatment, and the greater
stability and certainty that will come with the extinguishing of the dual
rights system, riparian landowners only give up freedom from OWRB
regulation and the risk of having their water-based investments diminished
by a new or expanded riparian use deemed to be more reasonable than their
uses.
III. The Non-Recognition of Hydraulic Connection Problem
A. The Problem
Groundwater basins are often hydraulically connected to lakes and
streams. When this occurs, groundwater pumping can affect the availability
of water in a lake or stream. In absence of monitoring and controlling for
these effects, groundwater pumping can seriously deplete lake levels and
stream flows in ways that interfere with water uses of those who have the
right to use lake and stream water, diminish aesthetic values, and diminish
the capacity of the lake or stream to support wildlife, aquatic life and water
recreation activities.170
Oklahoma property law confers on landowners ownership of
groundwater located beneath their land, but specifies that the use of ground
water is governed by Oklahoma’s groundwater law.171 As a consequence,
landowners must obtain a permit from the OWRB before drilling a well and
taking groundwater.172
Unfortunately, Oklahoma groundwater law is not protective of surface
water sources and the water rights and values they support. This stems
from Oklahoma’s definition of ground water, which is “fresh water under
the surface of the earth regardless of the geological structure in which it is
standing or moving outside the cut bank of any definite stream.”173
Although Oklahoma statutes do not define the term cut bank, it seems clear
that under Oklahoma law groundwater lies beneath the earth’s surface and
outside of the vertical extensions of a stream’s boundaries as defined by its
170. See Jacobs Ranch, L.L.C. v. Smith, 148 P.3d 842, 848 (Okla. 2006) (“[I]t is
undisputed that 1) aquifers in Oklahoma have suffered irreversible decline where
withdrawals exceeded the aquifer’s (sic) ability to recharge, such as the Ogallala Aquifer; 2)
decline in the groundwater level has resulted in the loss of the natural flow of streams, such
as the Beaver River in the Oklahoma panhandle; and 3) a decline in the groundwater level of
the Arbuckle-Simpson Groundwater Basin could jeopardize the flow of springs and streams,
such as the spring that is the source of the water for the city [sic] of Ada.”).
171. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 60 (2011).
172. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1020.7 (2011).
173. Id. § 1020.1(1).
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banks.174 For most groundwater sources, the cut bank rule means the
OWRB will issue a permit to drill for and take groundwater if it is to be
used beneficially and waste will not occur.175 However, since June 3, 2003,
the OWRB will not award a groundwater permit unless it also finds that
“the proposed use will not degrade or interfere with springs or streams
emanating in whole or in part from water originating in a sensitive sole
source groundwater basin.”176
Thus, Oklahoma groundwater law takes into account hydraulic
connections between groundwater sources and surface sources only when
the groundwater source is a sensitive sole source. The consequences of
Oklahoma’s incomplete recognition of hydraulic connections between
groundwater sources and surface sources are illustrated by two cases
involving attempts by prospective water users to take water in a manner that
would diminish or eliminate the flow a natural spring that was a source of
water for a stream.
In Oklahoma Water Resources Board v. City of Lawton,177 the
prospective water user sought to take all the flow of a natural spring that
broke through the surface of his land, traveled in a diffused manner for a
short distance, and then entered the channel of a stream.178 To capture the
water, the prospective water user was going to encase the spring at the point
where it broke through the surface in order to tap it before the spring water
reached the surface.179 The Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized that
groundwater is the source of all springs,180 and that Oklahoma property law
confers on landowners ownership of water flowing on the surface of their
land outside of definite streams.181 Nevertheless, because the flow of
stream had long been a source of water for a stream,182 the court held that
the spring water was stream water rather than groundwater or diffused
surface water.183 So, the prospective water user could not take the spring
water without first obtaining an appropriation permit.184
174. See Jensen, supra note 8, at 445-46.
175. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1020.9(A)(1)(b)-(c), (2)(b)(c).
176. Act of June 3, 2003, ch. 365, § 3, 2003 Okla. Sess. Laws 1576-77 (codified as 82
OKLA. STAT. § 1020.9(A)(1)(d), 2(d)).
177. 580 P.2d 510 (Okla. 1977).
178. Id. at 511.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 512-13.
182. Id. at 511.
183. Id. at 513.
184. Id.
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Twenty-three years later, in Messer-Bowers Company v. State of
Oklahoma,185 a prospective water user seeking permits to drill wells into a
groundwater basin faced opposition from other landowners who asserted
that pumping this groundwater from the basin would diminish the flow of
springs that either broke through the surface of their land or contributed
water to streams they relied on for their water uses.186 The opponents cited
Lawton in support of their assertions, contending that Lawton stood for the
proposition that taking groundwater in a manner that caused springs that
feed streams to go dry constitutes the taking of stream water.187
Unfortunately, the Oklahoma Supreme Court refused to extend the logic of
Lawton to the groundwater sources of springs that feed streams. Instead, it
held that the stream water appropriation laws apply only “when the
groundwater surfaces as a spring and forms a stream.”188 The prospective
water user sought to capture water directly from the groundwater basin that
is the source of springs, so the court held that he needed only to receive a
well permit under the rules specified by Oklahoma’s groundwater laws.189
Taken together, the cutbank rule and the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s
decisions in Lawton and Messer-Bowers produced absurd physical and
legal outcomes. By the logic of Messser-Bowers, the prospective water
user in Lawton would have been entitled to dry out the spring and reduce
the flow of the stream it fed simply by drilling a well into the groundwater
basin that fed the spring. This logic also entitles overlying landowners to
diminish the flow of streams by pumping groundwater through wells
bottomed outside of the streams’ cutbanks without having to obtain an
appropriation permit. The key physical connection in both cases is
hydraulically connected groundwater, and the key legal connection is the
Oklahoma Supreme Court’s unwillingness to protect the public’s interest in
stream water by regulating the private rights of overlying landowners to
pump groundwater. This creates great uncertainty for water users who
appropriate water from streams that depend on groundwater for a part of
their water supply.
B. Solutions to the Hydraulic Connection Problem
One obvious solution to the hydraulic connection problem would be to
modify the sole source protection provision as follows: the proposed use
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

8 P.3d 877 (Okla. 2000).
Id. at 879-80.
Id. at 880.
Id.
Id.
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will not degrade or interfere with springs or streams emanating in whole or
in part from water originating in from a sensitive sole source groundwater
basin. This modification would protect all springs and streams, not just
those involving groundwater basins designated by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency “as a sole or principal drinking water
source.”190
The protection provided by the suggested solution prevents groundwater
pumpers from diminishing springs and stream flows. This protection may
be more than is needed, even when drinking water is at stake, for it prevents
the pumping of groundwater to support a new or expanded beneficial use
that could be accommodated without negatively affecting other beneficial
uses.
Groundwater pumping that diminishes springs and stream flows has the
same effect on springs and stream flows as surface diversions from them by
appropriators. Water flows of springs and streams are diminished by the
appropriator taking water for a beneficial use. As documented previously,
prospective appropriators may receive a permit to divert water from surface
sources if there is enough water available to serve their newly permitted
uses without interfering with other beneficial stream water uses.191
This points the way to a more optimal recognition of hydraulic
connections between groundwater sources and surface sources.
Groundwater sources hydraulically connected to springs and streams should
be deemed tributary to those surface sources.192 Persons who wish to pump
water from tributary groundwater sources should be required to seek an
appropriation permit. The permits should be granted if the groundwater
will support a beneficial use and there is enough water available in the
affected spring or stream to accommodate the resulting diminution of its
190. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1020.9(A)-(B) (2011); Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 § 2(a),
88 Stat. 1678 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 300h-3(e) (2012)).
191. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 105.12.
192. This concept is borrowed from Colorado’s water laws. There, groundwater aquifers
are deemed to be tributary unless their hydraulic connection to a stream is so attenuated that
the withdrawal of water from them “will not, within one hundred years, deplete the flow of a
natural stream at an annual rate greater than one-tenth of one percent of the annual rate of
withdrawal.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103(10.5) (2011).
According to the Executive Report of the latest Oklahoma Comprehensive Water
Plan, Oklahoma’s 24 alluvial aquifers are hydraulically connected to streams and therefore
pumping from them can deplete water flows in streams to which they are hydraulically
connected. OKLA. WATER RES. BD., 2012 OKLAHOMA COMPREHENSIVE WATER PLAN:
EXECUTIVE REPORT 69-70 (2011). For a list of Oklahoma’s eleven major and thirteen minor
alluvial aquifers, see id. at 51.
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flows without interfering with existing spring/stream water uses. This
solution will end the uncertainty imposed on appropriators by Oklahoma’s
current groundwater laws while making water from tributary groundwater
sources more available to overlying landowners than does the sole source
solution.
IV. The Groundwater Mining Problem
A. The Problem
In general, dynamic groundwater aquifers are those that can produce
useful amounts of water on a sustained basis. Porosity and permeability are
the key determinants of whether a groundwater aquifer can produce useful
amounts of water.193 The ability of an aquifer to produce sustained yields is
largely determined by its average annual recharge rate.194 Aquifers with
favorable porosity and permeability that enjoy plentiful recharge rates can
produce large sustained yields as long as groundwater pumping does not
extract water from the aquifer at a rate greater than the recharge rate. When
groundwater pumping rates are higher than the recharge rate, the aquifer is
being mined, causing the water table to drop, pumping costs to increase,
risks of impaction destroying the ability of water to flow through the
aquifer to increase, and the ultimate depletion of the aquifer.195
Oklahoma’s groundwater law essentially mandates the mining of all its
aquifers. The OWRB is instructed to regulate the withdrawal of water from
Oklahoma’s major aquifers by establishing a Maximum Annual Yield
(MAY) “based upon a minimum basin or subbasin life of twenty (20)
years.”196 The OWRB has extended the 20 year minimum basin life to
minor groundwater aquifers.197 In carrying out this mandate, the OWRB
sets MAY’s at levels that will not deplete the aquifer totally in twenty (20)
193. LEONARD RICE & MICHAEL D. WHITE, ENGINEERING ASPECTS OF WATER LAW 11821 (1987). Porosity is “the ratio of the volume of open spaces to the total volume of rock.”
Id. at 118. Aquifers comprised of higher porosity materials tend to yield larger quantities of
water, but much depends on the size of the pores and interconnection of the voids. Id. at 119.
Permeability is “the ability of water . . . to move through a porous formation under the action
of a gradient.” Id. at 176. Gradient is “[a] slope of the water table tending to cause the flow
of groundwater.” Id. at 172.
194. Id. at 122-23. The rate of recharge is determined by the permeability of overlying
materials and the availability of water “from precipitation, streams or other sources.” Id. at
124.
195. Id. at 125-26.
196. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1020.5(A) (2011).
197. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 785:30-9-2(d) (2011).
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years but will deplete the reservoir to the level where beneath half of the
overlying acreage there is only enough water left to meet domestic needs.198
Still, as is illustrated below, this is a serious depletion that ultimately causes
the aquifer to be unable to sustain many non-domestic uses.
According the United State Geological Survey, in 2005 the United States
withdrew from all water sources about 460 million acre-feet of water for all
its water uses.199 The population of the United States was about 301
million,200 so each person’s share of the nation’s 2005 total water
withdrawals was about 1.53 AF/y.
When the OWRB calculated the MAY for the Elk City Aquifer, it found
that the Aquifer had an annual recharge rate of 36,458 AF/y, but it set the
MAY at 79,493 AF, which over a twenty year period of time would have
substantially depleted the aquifer.201 If this aquifer was not mined, it could
produce a sustained yield capable of meeting the water needs of 23,829
persons. Yet Oklahoma Groundwater Law mandates that this and other
renewable water sources be subject to mining largely so each overlying
landowner may have the opportunity to receive a per acre production quota
large enough to be useful.202
B. Solutions to the Groundwater Mining Problem
Oklahoma needs only to look to its past to solve the groundwater mining
problem. The 1949 Oklahoma Ground Water Law prohibited the issuance
of permits “for the extraction of water from a basin if such use would result
in the depletion above the average annual ratio of recharge.”203
Furthermore, users could be required to curtail pumping from an aquifer if
it was found that the withdrawal of water exceeded the safe annual yield set
for the aquifer.204 Setting a safe yield that does not exceed the aquifers
recharge rate would preserve the sustainable production capacities of
aquifers with generous recharge rates.
198. Telephone Interview with Dean Couch, supra note 10.
199. JOAN F. KENNEY ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN
THE UNITED STATES IN 2005, at 6 (circular 1344, 2009), available at http://pubs.usgs,
gov/circ/1344/pdf/c1344.pdf.
200. Id.
201. DOUGLAS C. KENT, TIM LYONS & FRED E. WITZ, OKLA. WATER RESEARCH INST.,
EVALUATION OF AQUIFER PERFORMANCE AND WATER SUPPLY CAPABILITIES OF THE ELK CITY
AQUIFER IN WASHITA, BECKHAM, CUSTER AND ROGERS MILLS COUNTIES IN OKLAHOMA 60
(1982).
202. Jensen, supra note 8, at 465; Telephone Interview with Dean Couch, supra note 10.
203. Okla. Ground Water Law, ch. 11, § 13, 1949 Okla. Sess. Laws 645.
204. Id. § 15.
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For aquifers that do not have sustainable recharge rates, the only choices
are to mine them or not use them at all. If the choice is to mine the aquifer,
it must be made with the clear understanding that the uses the mining will
support are also unsustainable.205 Sooner or later the pumping costs will get
too high or the aquifer’s supply will get too low or the aquifer will suffer
impaction in a way that reduces its ability to deliver adequate volumes of
water.206 Moreover, any plant or other life that had been sustained by the
aquifer prior to its water table level being lowered through mining will no
longer be viable.207 Mining of tributary aquifers definitely should not be
allowed in order to protect the sustainablity of the streams to which they are
hydraulically connected.
V. Conclusion
Oklahoma has been blessed with bountiful water supplies.208 But it is
presently afflicted with water laws that subject Oklahoma’s water users to
great uncertainty about the value of their water rights. Water users with
rights to use stream water are especially at risk, for their appropriative uses
have been subordinated to the rights of riparian and overlying landowners
to initiate conflicting uses. Groundwater users are authorized to race to the
bottom, a race for which there can be no winner.
For now, Oklahoma’s plentiful water supplies may be masking the risks
and uncertainties created by a dysfunctional dual rights system, the failure
of Oklahoma’s water laws to require the co-management of most
hydraulically connected streams and groundwater aquifers, and
groundwater laws that encourage groundwater mining. This good fortune
cannot continue. Nearly fifty years after they were adopted, it is time to
restore the 1963 water reforms’ vision of a water rights system unified
around the Appropriation Doctrine. Having recognized the necessity of comanaging hydraulically connected springs, streams, and sole source
aquifers, it is time to extend the benefits of this co-management to users of
every stream that is hydraulically connected to a groundwater source.
Having survived the ravages of the Dust Bowl Days, Oklahoma must
discontinue its groundwater mining policies that have the potential to turn
renewable water sources into dust.
205. See 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 18.04, at 18-45 to 18-50 (Robert E. Beck ed.,
2003) [hereinafter WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 2003 ED.]; Gleick, supra note 11.
206. 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 2003 ED., supra note 205, § 18.04, at 18-45 to 18-50.
207. Gleick, supra note 11.
208. OKLA. WATER RES. BD., supra note 192, at 3.
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